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Abstract 
The Merkel Government’s decision in 2011 to phase-out nuclear power in Germany by 2022 
marked a seminal moment in German energy policy. The decision after the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident was a combination of a strong anti-nuclear movement and impending 
elections conducive to its realization. As much as mounting public pressure was pivotal in the 
nuclear shutdown, public acceptance has been equally important in subsequent 
implementation of the Energiewende. Public opposition to infrastructure projects needed to 
realize secure supply of energy, such as the expansion of the transmission grid and 
development of wind farms, has faced local opposition and been attributed to NIMBY (Not 
In My Backyard) behavior, opposed to a perceived decrease in aesthetic appeal, real estate 
value, and associated health costs. However, an analysis of research conducted on public 
opinions reflects that more than the largely localized NIMBY resistance, changes in 
affordability could have a greater impact on acceptance levels.  Relative to nuclear, the 
System Levelized Costs of Energy and the inherent profile, balancing, and dispatchability 
costs are problematic for further renewable integration. Additionally, continually increasing 
domestic consumer prices and unequal distribution of the EEG surcharge could further 
augment public resistance.  
The paper further compares public opinions before and after the nuclear phase-out. The anti-
nuclear movement can be largely characterized as a NIABY (Not In Any Backyard) 
movement with collectively resonating norms against it. In contrast, public attitudes after the 
phase-out are a combination of NIMBY-ism and resistance to specific projects without 
rejecting the overarching principle as a whole reflected in a majority of the German public 
polling in favour of the Energiewende being relevant for the German population.  Of 
importance also is the role of perceived justice and fairness and the lack thereof could also 
lower public acceptance, especially in terms of distribution of the costs of the Energiewende. 
To this end, the paper concludes that while not currently of a scale comparable to the anti-
nuclear movement, public opinions must nonetheless be engaged by the Government through 
more transparent and collaborative decision making processes. While the German 
government is taking steps towards including the public more, most of its plans are still 
nascent and their efficacy remains to be assessed after they are implemented.  
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1. Introduction 
This Master Thesis seeks to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the nature of public 
attitudes in Germany, before and after Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Coalition Government’s 
decision in 2011 to phase-out nuclear power in the country following the accident at the 
Fukushima Daiichi reactor in Japan. This paper contends that while the German Energy 
Transition or the Energiewende is usually analyzed through three foci — security of supply, 
affordability, and sustainability, its success rests in large part on its public acceptance as well 
as the policies required to realize the proposed goals. While Germany is on track to satisfy 
the share of renewables in final energy consumption, it lags behind in meeting the targets for 
reduction in GHG emissions and energy efficiency.  
Building on this argument, the paper examines the social processes that impact both – the 
decision to withdraw from nuclear power as well as Germany’s ambitious targets for an 
increased share of renewables in the German energy and electricity mixes. The framework 
thus incorporates the three interconnected tenets of the Energiewende: security of supply, 
affordability, and sustainability but in line with the proposed argumentation, analyses it 
within the overall aegis of public acceptance. This chapter thus introduces the research 
question of the paper and introduces the context in which it emerges—the nuclear shutdown 
and the German Energiewende.  
1.1.  Research Question 
The Merkel government’s decision to shut down nuclear plants in Germany was primarily a 
response to growing public agitation after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor accident in 
2011. However, the acquiescence to public opinion in this case creates difficulties in 
successfully reducing GHG emissions given the initially proposed role of nuclear energy as a 
bridge in the Energy concept until renewables had been integrated successfully. The 
withdrawal from nuclear will consequently result in greater dependence on fossil fuels such 
as coal and to a lesser degree, natural gas to fulfill the aforementioned bridging role making it 
more difficult to achieve the required reduction in GHG emissions.  
In parallel, and with greater importance after the decision for a nuclear phase-out, Germany is 
likely to satisfy the share of renewables in energy consumption. Public approval for greater 
integration of renewables has been high. At the same time, the increased integration of 
renewables necessitates parallel development of the national electrical grids for requisite 
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transport of the electricity. However, critics question the magnitude of these plans especially 
its impact on security of supply and affordability. This is further exacerbated by opposition 
from local communities opposing the social costs such as diminishing property values and 
lower amenity value of landscapes, which could be a result of the eventual siting of new 
electrical facilities such as masts and power lines. This conflict is referred to as ‘NIMBY-ism’ 
(Not In My Backyard behavior) and could increase in coming years. Grid expansion is central 
to ensure that German meets its target of 55% of power generated from renewable sources by 
2035 but while support for renewable energies is evident, the implementation and application 
of proposed plans could be challenged by this opposition. 
In light of this situation, the paper seeks to delve into the following topic:  
Nuclear Shutdown to NIMBY-ism: An Assessment of Public Attitudes Before and 
After the Nuclear Phase-out in Germany 
Encompassed within the aegis of this topic are the following questions, which the thesis seeks 
to answer. 
 To what extent do changes in security of supply, affordability, and sustainability 
impact public acceptance? 
 To what extent are public attitudes before and after the nuclear shutdown different? 
 What challenges confront public acceptance of the German Government’s 
implementation of the Energiewende and how can it best address it? 
1.2. The Nuclear Shutdown 
Wende is German for a reversal or U-turn and in the context of German energy policy, refers 
to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s announcement of the Energiewende in the aftermath of the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan in March 2011—the expedited switch to renewables and 
the parallel shutdown of Germany’s remaining 17 nuclear plants (Gross, 2011). Six months 
prior to the announcement of the Energiewende, Merkel’s conservative-liberal Democrat 
Coalition Government had reversed a plan by her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder’s social 
Democrat-Green party coalition in 2000 to have the last nuclear reactor go offline by 2020. 
Instead, Merkel extended the lifetime of the 10 more modern reactors to dates between 2028 
and 2035. The remaining 7 were intended to stay online until 2018 or 2020. Essentially, in 
reversing Schröder’s decision, Merkel’s decision had extended the lifetime of the reactors by 
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an average of an extra 12 years compared to the earlier plan (Gross, 2011). While a proponent 
of nuclear technology, Merkel changed her mind after the Fukushima accident in Japan on 
the 11th of March. The fact that a nuclear disaster could impact one of the world’s most 
technologically advanced nations was a cause for alarm and the Merkel government 
deliberated the idea of a moratorium, essentially cancelling the runtime extension and 
switching off the remaining 7 older reactors for at least three months (Gross, 2011). The 
nuclear shutdown in discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.3.2 (p.29).  
1.3. Goals of the Energy Transition 
Germany has established a salient challenge in terms of its energy policy—moving away 
from fossil fuels and nuclear power, while still trying to retain its position as a major 
industrial power. Termed the Energiewende, the German Energy Transition has the following 
goals within the overarching premise of a secure, environmentally friendly, and economically 
successful future (BMWi): 
i) Taking the last nuclear plant in Germany off stream in 2022 
ii) Incorporating a greater share of renewable energy, which is to account for 80% of 
electricity supply by 2050 
iii) Less dependence on oil and gas imports 
iv) Reduction of environmentally harmful Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 80 to 
95% by 2050 
v) More efficient use of energy 
vi) Utilizing the restructuring of energy supply to drive innovation for Germany as an 
industrial base, in turn generating growth and creating sustainable and secure jobs 
Drawing upon these goals, The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) 
identifies two key pillars for the energy transition: Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. 
The first of these calls for greater integration of renewable sources such as solar and wind to 
produce 50% of electricity by 2030. The latter focuses on using less energy by utilizing 
modern, energy efficient technologies and changing public behavior to minimize energy use. 
In June 2014, the BMWi drew out a ’10-point energy agenda’ which delineates subsequent 
steps and key projects in the 18
th
 legislative term.  
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An overview of the ten key points as adapted from ‘The energy transition: key projects of the 
18
th
 legislative term’ published by the BMWi are as follows (BMWi, 2014):  
i) Renewables, Renewable Energy Sources Act: The 2014 reform of the Renewable 
Energy Sources Act (EEG) has facilitated the feasible funding of renewables for 
the future, at the same time working towards a demanding expansion corridor and 
ensuring that electricity intensive manufacturing in Germany remains competitive.  
 
Additionally, subsequent action towards competition-based promotion of 
renewable energy sources is planned. In January 2015, the BMWi presented the 
ordinance governing pilot auctions for ground-mounted photovoltaic installations 
basis which, a pilot project is to be implemented in 2015. The findings from this 
project will in turn be fed into the EEG; the revision of the EEG scheduled to be 
adopted in 2016 intends to place the rules for the level of funding for renewables 
(all technologies) to normally be set by auction. 
 
ii) European Climate and Energy Framework 2010/ETS: The BMWi underscores the 
importance of decisions reached by the European Council of October 2014 on the 
European climate and energy framework 2030, as well as the reform of European 
emissions trading in successfully implementing energy reforms. These decisions 
continue the tripartite targets adopted under the German EU Council Presidency: 
40% reduction in internal EU GHG emissions (versus 1990); a separate and 
binding EU target of 27% for the share of renewables in energy consumption; and 
finally, an energy efficiency target of 27% at the minimum.  
 
iii) Electricity market design: The BMWi seeks to ensure that the electricity market of 
the future makes efficient use of power plants with parallel increase in the share of 
renewables. Simultaneously, the market design must ensure that energy is secure. 
 
iv) Regional cooperation (in EU)/internal market: The success of the Energiewende 
is contingent on the integration of Europe’s electricity markets. Consumers of 
electricity would benefit from more choice, lower electricity prices, and greater 
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energy security and Germany accordingly seeks to deepen cooperation in Europe 
to progress further on integration of markets.  
 
v) Transmission grids: To ensure both security of supply and affordability of 
electricity, several thousand kilometers of upgraded or new power lines are 
needed, especially to ensure requisite transmission of renewables to users—both 
industries and households.  
 
vi) Distribution grids: Distribution grids will have to be adapted to account for the 
Energiewende, particularly to connect the greater share of electricity generated by 
renewables.  
 
vii) Efficiency strategy: Energy efficiency is the second pillar of the Energiewende, as 
established when the National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (NAPE) was 
adopted in early December 2014. The Plan outlines the Federal Government’s 
energy efficiency strategy for the 18
th
 legislative term and seeks to involve all 
stakeholders to improve and bolster energy efficiency. 
 
viii) Buildings strategy: In December 2014, the BMWi published a paper on 
‘Renovation Needs in the Building Stock’ to chart how buildings could be made 
virtually climate neutral by 2050; this forms the precursor for the Energy 
Efficiency Strategy for Buildings, intended to be adopted in November 2015.  
  
ix) Gas supply strategy: Security of gas supply needs to be ensured for the future, 
especially given that gas covers slightly less than 25% of Germany’s primary 
energy consumption.  
 
x) Monitoring of the energy transition/Platforms: To more closely monitor the 
progress of its energy reforms and intervene when required, the Federal 
Government launched the ‘Energy of the future’ monitoring process. Additionally, 
current expert forums and platforms have been reformed to successfully 
incorporate different groups in society. 
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1.4. Structure of Paper 
This thesis is divided into six chapters, the content for which is as follows. 
Chapter 1 introduces the research question and the context in which it emerges. The research 
topic is deconstructed into three specific questions encompassed within the broader topic. 
More specifically, it outlines the two cornerstones of the paper—Germany’s decision for a 
nuclear phase-out and the guiding tenets of the Energiewende towards a low carbon energy 
system. 
Chapter 2 provides the academic background and theoretical underpinnings to understand 
NIMBY-ism and the scope of public opposition. Through a brief discussion of literature on 
public resistance to infrastructure projects, the chapter seeks to delineate the key attributes of 
public resistance movements with a focus on NIMBY-ism. This is essential to discern the 
nature of both, the anti-nuclear movement in Germany and emergent resistance to grid 
extension and wind power development in Germany.  
Chapter 3 deconstructs the background needed to understand the issue in question. The 
chapter begins with an overview of the status quo in terms of the German energy and 
electricity mixes. Thereafter, the section focuses on nuclear power in Germany given the 
paper’s focus on the shutdown and an evaluation of opinions before and after it. The section 
first goes into chronological details of nuclear power, charting the historical overview, the 
shutdown, and the current status. Thereafter, the section delves into the organization of the 
German nuclear power industry to discern the different decision making processes embedded 
in it. The next parts of the section focus on safety given that safety was one of the major 
concerns after the Fukushima Daiichi accident; to this end, first safety standards for nuclear 
power in Germany are discussed and they are then compared with the reactors in Chernobyl 
and Fukushima. Finally, the viability of Thorium as an alternative is discussed.  
Chapter 4 is the main analytical chapter of the thesis. The analysis is conducted as a 
comprehensive literature review of academic papers, Governmental publications, such as 
those published by the Federation of German Industry (BDI) and the BMWi, and reports 
from consultancy firms, independent think tanks, and international organizations such as the 
IEA, IAEA, and the OECD. In doing so, the chapter incorporates different perspectives on 
the German Energy Transition and seeks to provide an enriched understanding of the 
interplay between these different stakeholders. The chapter conducts this review through the 
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three pillars of Security of Supply, Affordability, and Sustainability, paying specific attention 
to factors that could affect public acceptance. The chapter then leads into a specific 
discussion of public attitudes towards nuclear power in Germany and the current state of 
public acceptance, especially towards the greater integration of more renewable sources.  
Chapter 5 provides a comparative analysis of public acceptance before and after the nuclear 
phase-out in Germany based on findings of the literature review in Chapter 4. At the same 
time, it identifies issues of priority to the German public and the need for more participatory 
governance.  
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion summing up key findings of the paper as well as providing 
questions that the German Government must consider for subsequent implementation of the 
Energiwende.   
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2. Theory 
Schweizer et al. (2014) posit that while a policy decision may be the result of a democratic 
process, it is nonetheless not sufficient for many to accept it. Three major characteristics are 
identified in protest movements against infrastructure developments (Schweizer, et al., 2014, 
p. 2).  
(i) Citizens are expected to forego personal conveniences, at least temporarily, in 
favor of a proposed benefit to the larger community 
(ii) The proposed benefit is contentious insofar as it is difficult for the project 
planners, governmental or private, to communicate the benefit is a way acceptable 
to all. This could be caused due to problems in communication but is largely a 
result of plurality in opinions and preferences. In the case of the Energiewende, 
this is illustrated in discrepancies on whether wind farms should be constructed in 
idyllic landscapes or if networks from wind farms in the North Sea to industrial 
hubs in Bavaria are necessary 
(iii) Citizens directly affected by projects often view the decision-making process as 
being intransparent or corrupt, often mirrored in a gap between legality and 
legitimacy. For instance, even if implementation of transmission lines and wind 
farms complete all the requisite approval processes, their embedded complexity 
may cause citizens to feel overwhelmed and consequently removed from the 
decision making process 
These trends are very much in line with literature on public opposition to infrastructure 
projects which are discussed subsequently.  
2.1. Understanding NIMBY-ism 
- NIMBY-ism and Selfishness 
Van der Horst (2007) defines NIMBY behavior as a phenomenon wherein certain services 
are deemed beneficial by the majority of the population in principle, but in practice the 
facilities to provide these services are usually opposed by local residents (Horst, 2007). 
However, beyond this simplistic definition, literature indicates that public opposition to a 
local development is more nuanced. 
Wolsink (2000), for example, proposes that contrary to NIMBY-ism being largely seen as 
common sense, it is in fact rooted in specific psychological (social dilemma) or economic 
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(game-situation) theories regarding provision of public goods. Essentially, individual 
preferences to maximize their own utility cause some public goods to be not produced, even 
when all individuals in that society want that good provided. The utility maximization entails 
an assessment of personal costs and benefits, stimulating free rider behavior. This evaluation 
of personal costs and benefits aligns with Schweizer et al.’s assertion (2009) that a public 
movement is characterized by the expectation that an individual must forego personal 
benefits for the interests of the larger community.  
At its core, NIMBY-ism would is thus caused by selfish motives which in turn obstruct 
realization of societal goals. Using wind power to illustrate this, Wolsink (2000) points that in 
line with NIMBY principles, local residents on one hand, oppose a project to maximize their 
own utility but because they are in favor of wind power, they would be expected to welcome 
all turbines not built in their vicinity. However, Wolsink (2000) quantitatively concludes that 
data barely reveals citizens with both inclinations; in fact, people with NIMBY feelings are 
generally not in favor of wind power and their behavior is primarily grounded in their lack of 
support for wind turbines anywhere. 
Wolsink (2000) further contends that by labeling public opposition as NIMBY, the wide 
range of public attitudes cannot be adequately encompassed and instead typifies resistance 
into the following four categories.  
- Resistance Type A: Positive attitude towards the principle in addition to opposition to 
the implementation of the project in one’s own neighborhood (NIMBY behavior). 
- Resistance Type B: Negative attitude to a principle due to general opposition to the 
implementation of the project in any neighborhood (NIABY – Not In Any Backyard 
behavior).  
- Resistance Type C: Positive attitude towards the principles which becomes negative 
as a result of discussion surrounding implementation of the project caused by 
evolving risk perceptions as part of the decision making process. 
- Resistance Type D: Resistance on the grounds that some specific projects may be 
faulty without rejection of the principle as a whole. For example, in wind power 
development, opposition may be limited to wind farms on specific locations based on 
the impact it could have on the scenery and to a lesser extent, the interference or 
nuisance it might cause. 
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- Visual Appeal 
In terms of nomenclature itself, the use of the word NIMBY while preferred by proponents is 
contentious among those who oppose planned developments.  
Wolsink (2000) further emphasizes this point by drawing upon attitudes towards wind 
projects instead of wind power. He divides attitudes towards wind projects as the visual 
assessment of scenic value of wind turbines (VISUAL), interference factors - birds, nature, 
noise, shadow flicker (ANNOY), and the environmental benefits of clean energy (CLEAN) 
(Wolsink, Wind power and the NIMBY-myth: institutional capacity and the limited 
significance of public support, 2000). When examining these attitudes through statistical 
analysis, Wolsink found that only two of these affected wind power attitudes (WPATTIT) – 
the visual appeal of the turbines and to a lesser extent, the benefits of clean energy. In terms 
of resistance to wind projects (WTRESIST), both visual appeal and annoyance weighed in, 
with visual appeal being more significant. Finally, NIMBY behavior (NIMBY) and perceived 
self-efficacy (EFFIC), while contributory, have weak relations.  As such, the visual appeal of 
the turbines becomes particularly salient since it contributes directly to resistance against 
wind projects and indirectly by determining attitudes to wind power. 
 
Figure 1: Direct and indirect impact of arguments and motives on resistance to wind turbine projects (Source: Wolsink, 
Wind power and the NIMBY-myth: institutional capacity and the limited significance of public support, 2000, p.7) 
 
- Equity and Fairness 
Much like Horst (2007), Wolsink (2007) also refers to a gap between public attitudes towards 
a principle and those towards a practice, exemplifying the same as public attitudes towards 
wind power and wind farms. However, rather than the selfishness inherent to NIBMY-ism, he 
emphasizes the role of equity and fairness instead (Wolsink, Wind power implementation: 
The nature of public attitudes: Equity and fairness instead of ‘backyard motives’, 2007). 
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Wolsink contends that instead of the egotism central to NIMBY-ism wherein individuals 
want to pass on their burden to others, they actually consider it unfair that others, or decision 
makers, shift the burden to them. Accordingly, at the core of public opposition issues is fair 
decision making that does not entail any perceived injustice. The perceived fairness in 
making decisions about siting facilities is, for example, strongly related to perceived 
environmental risk and core values on how society should take such decisions by 
incorporating all stakeholders.  
- Place attachment 
As an alternative to NIMBY-ism, disruption to place attachment and the theory of social 
representations could also be vital in understanding the nature of public opposition to 
infrastructure projects. (Devine-Wright & Howes, 2010) 
2.2. Scope of Public Opposition 
Based on available literature, the scope of NIBMY-ism includes the distance, the stage of 
development, and the people involved in the opposition.  
- Distance 
Wolsink (2000) suggests that concerns regarding specific project development are local in 
nature and not global. For example, for wind power, the type of landscape is integral to 
determining the scenic beauty ratings of turbines within the landscape. The characteristics of 
the selected site are thus vital in the development of public attitudes. Thus, on-site specific 
features are particularly important when shaping attitudes towards an infrastructure project. 
At the same time, Horst (2007) identifies the need to determine what surveyed individuals 
identify as locations that they consider to be of great importance to them. In turn, this implies 
that academics must be cautious to not assume the possible geographic extent of concerns 
raised by individual residents within a specific locality (Horst, 2007). Traditionally, the 
‘backyard’ in NIMBY has referred to some geographical catchment area for selfish behavior 
(Horst, 2007). This in turn implies that opposition to a proposed project is largely local in 
nature, due to limited information or impediments to exerting pressure when it comes to 
distant projects. However, Horst (2007) further contends that this administrative handicap 
may not suffice as an explanation especially given the presence of some non-local protestors 
suggesting that these concerns may in fact transcend local administrative borders.   
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- Stage of planning 
Horst (2007) identifies differences in the temporal extent of NIMBY-ism, with regards to the 
development of a local project—before people are aware of the plan, during the planning 
phase and finally, after the project has been realized and is operational. Wolsink (2007) sees 
attitudes as developing in a U shape based on Horst’s temporal dimensions—positive when 
people are not confronted by a project in their neighborhood, critical after its announcement, 
and positive after some time reasonable time has elapsed after the project is operational. 
Wolsink (2000, 2007) contends that the announcement of a project is when its impact is most 
emphasized. The number of those in favor of wind power development reaches a minimum 
when specific schemes are announced and publicly discussed.  
This finds agreement in Horst (2007) who contends that the strongest opposition is prevalent 
during the planning phase – and that inherent difficulties to secure local planning permission 
have brought NIMBY behavior to the forefront of this rhetoric. As such, he advocates 
abandoning academic reference to the ‘before’ (when the project is still hypothetical) and 
‘after’ phases of project development. 
- People 
In terms of the people encompassed within this opposition, Horst (2007) also points to the 
difference between active or passive support or opposition. In this case, active opponents of a 
development, including those who lobby and protest are at the crux of the NIMBY debate 
while passive opponents may not resonate with the same magnitude of strength or feelings 
within the premise of NIMBY behavior. This may be attributed to their acceptance of the 
principle of the project and therefore, make them less willing to actively make efforts to 
facilitate rejection of planning permission of the project by local authorities.  
2.3. Institutional Factors 
Wolsink (2000) argues that factors other than public attitudes can impede projects from being 
realized. He points to the discrepancy between broad support for wind power but not wind 
power projects and addresses the extent of public acceptance of a project. While this reflects 
Horst’s dichotomy of support in principle but not in practice, Wolsink contends that factors 
other than public attitudes could be formative instead suggesting the importance of 
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institutional factors in impeding planned projects from reaching fruition. For instance, the top 
down approach to project planning and development by assuming public acceptance or 
requesting it later (decide-announce-defend model) are obstructive to realizing certain 
infrastructure projects. Thus, institutional capacity, essential to realize infrastructure projects, 
is bolstered by collaborative planning (Wolsink, Wind power and the NIMBY-myth: 
institutional capacity and the limited significance of public support, 2000). Strong public 
support, while not sufficient, contributes favorably to siting policy and will thus be more 
favorable than top down planning. This again aligns with the contention by Schweizer et al. 
(2009) that a protest movement could be caused by perceived corruption or intransparency, 
overcoming which could result in legitimacy aligning with legality. 
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3. Background 
3.1. German Energy Mix 
The Total German Primary Energy Supply (TPES) in 2013 was 312,4 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (Mtoe), showing a relative decline of -0,8% since 2003 (International Energy 
Agency, 2014) The TPES is forecasted by the Federal Government to further reduce over the 
next twenty years to 216,7 Mtoe in 2030 (International Energy Agency, 2013). 
 
Figure 2: Germany Energy Mix (Source: Adapted from International Energy Agency, 2013) 
As illustrated in Figure 2, oil contributes the most to Germany’s TPES amounting to 33% in 
2013. However, this value has decreased from 36% in 2003 and while the Government 
forecasts continued decline in oil’s share in the energy mix, it is nonetheless going to remain 
the most significant source of energy at 28,2% of Germany’s TPES in 2030 (International 
Energy Agency, 2013; International Energy Agency, 2014). In contrast to oil, the share of 
both coal and natural gas have remained relatively stable contributing 25% and 23% in 2011; 
the latter is expected to remain a significant source of energy forecasted to increase to 25% of 
TPES by 2030 (International Energy Agency, 2013, 2014). Renewables comprised 
approximately 11,9 % of TPES in 2013, with biofuels and waste constituting the most 
important renewable source contributing 9% (International Energy Agency, 2014). Since 
2000, renewables have seen strong growth in their contribution to Germany’s energy mix 
with a growth from 4% share in 2003 to 11,9 in 2013 (International Energy Agency, 2014). 
25 
 
 
According to the IEA, by 2030, their growth is expected to continue with biofuels at 21,6%, 
wind at 5,6%, solar at 3,2%, geothermal at 1,9%, and hydro at 1% (International Energy 
Agency, 2013). Finally, nuclear energy comprised 8% of Germany’s TPES which reflects a 
decline of share of 5% (from 13%) since 2003 and expected to be phased out within the aegis 
of the Energy Package 2011 (International Energy Agency, 2014, p. 1). 
Germany’s Total Final Consumption (TFC) of Energy was at 221 Mtoe in 2012, which has 
been declining by 0,6% annually since 2002. In terms of use of energy by sector, the 
industrial sector (35%) is inevitably the largest end-user of energy followed by residential use 
(26%), transport (24%) and commercial (15%) (International Energy Agency, 2014, p. 1). 
3.2. German Electricity Mix 
Germany’s gross electricity generation was 633,2 TWh in 2013 compared to 613,1 TWh in 
2011. According to the AG Energiebilanzen e.V (2015, p. 1), the country’s major electricity 
source was coal with an overall share of 44,6% (19,2% hard coal and 25,4% brown coal). The 
share of electricity generated by nuclear power plants declined from 22,2% in 2010 to 17,6% 
in 2011 and down to 15,4% in 2013. The share of natural gas decreased from 14 % in 2011 to 
10,4 in 2013. Renewable energy sources, on the other hand, experienced a strong increase in 
the same time, with an overall share of 24,1% in 2013 (from 20,2% in 2011). (AG 
Energiebilanzen e.V, 2015, p. 1) 
 
Figure 3: Gross Electricity Generation Germany 2013 (Source: AG Energiebilanzen e.V, 2015, p. 1) 
Natural Gas 
10,7% 
Brown Coal 
25,4% 
Hard Coal 
19,2% 
Oil 
1,1% 
Others 
4,1% 
Nuclear 
15,4% 
Biomass 
6,5% 
PV 
4,9% 
Wind 
8,1% 
Hydro 
3,6% 
Waste 
1 % 
Renewables, 
24,1 
26 
 
 
3.3. Nuclear energy production in Germany 
3.3.1. Historical overview and the shut down 
Nuclear energy generation has been part of Germany’s supply for more than six 
decades. Between 1955 and the late 1960s, the Federal Republic of Germany started 
founding a large number of institutions to promote research and the peaceful use of 
nuclear technology for electricity generation A Ministry for Nuclear Affairs was 
established and the first academic institutes were soon provided with research reactors. 
It must be noted however, that from the beginning, the Federal Republic of Germany 
simultaneously banned any activity connected to the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
by releasing an official declaration. As a consequence, The Federal Republic of 
Germany could benefit from adequate international collaboration and it was able to 
build the first prototype reactors and develop a series of plans for a closed fuel cycle 
and the treatment and storage of radioactive waste (IAEA, 2013). 
 On the 31
st
 of October, 1957, Germany’s first nuclear reactor was put into service, a 
research reactor of the Technical University of Munich (DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2014 (b)). Few months later, the former Federal Ministry for Nuclear 
Affairs implemented the Reaktorsicherheitskommission (RSK) to maintain and 
ascertain the security of nuclear operations within the country. In 1960, the 
Atomgesetz, West Germany’s first legislative basis for building and operating nuclear 
power plants, was adopted and the Versuchatomkraftwerk Kahl, an experimental-plant 
based on US American technology with a capacity of 16 MWe reached criticality 
(DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014). The same year, the Karlsruher 
Kernforschungszentrum commissioned Germany’s first domestically developed 
reactor, the FR-2. Few years later, Western Germany initiated the commercial use of 
nuclear power and commissioned reactors with up to 700 MWe capacity (I.E.A - 
International Energy Agency, 2013). In 1969, the Kerntechnische Gesellschaft e.V 
(KTG), an association of nuclear scientist and experts, was founded. In 1971, 
Germany initiated the radioactive waste repository facility ERAM Morsleben and one 
year later, West Germany’s nuclear industry earned international recognition by 
initiating the construction of the Biblis A power plant, the most substantial nuclear 
reactor known at that time. The Biblis reactor was put into service only two years later 
and became the world’s first reactor with a capacity of 1200 MWe. At the same time , 
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Siemens and AEG created the Kraftwerk Union (KWU) to develop and export the 
Konvoi, a 1300 MWe standardized Pressurized Water Reactor (DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2014). In 1972, the commercial reactors Stade, Würgassen and 
Niederaichbach started to feed electricity into the German grid. The same year, the 
Kernforschungsanlage Jülich, initiated the construction of a Thorium-high 
temperature reactor in Uentrop and a fast breeder reactor in Kalkar (DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2014). In the following years the reactors Biblis B, Neckarwestheim 
I and Brunsbüttel (1976), Isar 1 (1977), Unterweser (1978), Philippsburg 1 (1979), 
Grafenrheinfeld (1981), Krümmel (1983), Gundremmingen B, Gundremmingen C, 
Grohnde and Philipsburg 2 (all 1984) were commissioned (DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2014). Furthermore, experts accomplished a controlled nuclear 
fission in the THTR-300 Thorium high-pressure reactor in Hamm-Uentrop. Although 
Western Germany’s early technological progress had highly depended on 
international support, including US American manufacturers such as GE/AEG, 
Western German technology had quickly become internationally renowned and was 
exported around the world from the early 1970s (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 
2014 (b)). 
However, the rise of nuclear power was not a uniquely Western German occurrence. 
In 1955, at the same time as the Federal Republic of Germany, the German 
Democratic Republic (DDR), with substantial support from the Soviet Union, also 
initiated activities aimed at the peaceful use of nuclear technology and founded the 
Rossendorf Nuclear Physics Institute (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014). In 
1966, the first commercial nuclear power plant, the Reihnsberg reactor, was put into 
service and eight years later the Greifswald units 1-4 were commissioned (IAEA, 
2013). 
Along with the development of Germany’s nuclear operations, rose an increasing 
criticism towards the use of nuclear energy in the country. In 1976, the first anti-
nuclear demonstrations were held in Broksdorf and nuclear skepticism found growing 
support after the Three Mile Island accident in Harrisburg in 1979 (DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2014). On the 26
th
 of April, 1986, a major nuclear accident occurred 
in the fourth unit of the Soviet nuclear power plant Chernobyl in the former Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2011). The latter 
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incident led to countrywide demonstrations against the construction of the 
reprocessing facility Wackersdorf and Germany’s general engagement in nuclear 
operations (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014 (b)).  
In 1987, The Federal Republic of Germany introduced the IMIS, the Integrated 
System for Measuring and Assessing Environmental Radioactivity and two years later, 
the Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz –BfS, today’s Federal Office for Radiation 
Protection, was founded. Even-though the Chernobyl accident had created broad 
resentment against nuclear power within the German population, the government 
commissioned the construction of two new reactors in 1989: Isar 2, Emsland and 
Neckarwestheim II (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014).  After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and with the reunification of the German Democratic Republic with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Germany started an extensive inspection of the existing 
nuclear power plants which led to the decision to de-commission new power plants 
based on Soviet technology, namely Rheinsberg and Greifswald, and to stop the 
construction of those that had already been initiated (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum 
e.V, 2014). From this point on, no commercial nuclear reactors were commissioned. 
In 1995, the decommissioning of the Würgassen reactor was initiated and in 1998, the 
Alliance ’90 – a coalition agreement between the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany and the Greens determined that Germany would slowly start phasing out 
nuclear energy (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014). On the 14
th
 of June, 2000, 
the German Federal Government and the German utilities entered into an agreement 
establishing on the one hand, limitations on nuclear energy generation with respect to 
the overall national supply, while on the other hand assuring the undisturbed 
operation of the existing nuclear power plants (Vereinbarung zwischen der 
Bundesregierung und den Energieversorgungsunternehmen vom 14. Juni 2000). Two 
years later, the agreement was incorporated in the updated Atomgesetz, the German 
Atomic Energy Act (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014 (b)).  
Changes were also occurring in other European countries and 2005 represented an 
important year for nuclear technologies throughout Europe. The Finnish government 
commissioned the Olkilouto 3 reactor, the first of a new generation of nuclear power 
plants (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014 (b)). Simultaneously a broad union 
of States, including the European Union member Countries, the Peoples Republic of 
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China, the Republic of India, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the 
United States of America launched the International Thermonuclear Experimental 
Reactor (ITER) fusion reactor program in Cadrache, France (DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2014). In September 2010, the newly elected German government, 
led by the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Free Democratic 
Party (FDP), approved the 11
th
 Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, determining 
the life span of a number of already existing nuclear reactors throughout the country. 
The activity of reactors older than 1980 was prolonged by 8 years, whereas that of 
reactors built after 1980 was extended by 14 years (BMUi, 2012).  
3.3.2. The Shut Down 
Until the 11
th
 of March 2011, it was hard to imagine that Japan would play such a 
significant role in the nuclear energy-policy of Germany. The accident in the 
Fukushima Daiichi power plant following the tremendous earthquake that hit the 
country drew global attention to nuclear energy generation and inevitably raised 
questions connected to the safety of such operations (Pesch, Martinsen, Heinrichs, & 
Hake, 2012). 
 
The first reaction of Germany’s policy makers was to ask the Reactor Safety 
Commission (RSK) to examine and test the safety of the seventeen operating German 
nuclear power plants (BMUi, 2012). Based on theses test's results and the 
recommendations from the RSK, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear safety commissioned its technical support branch, the GRS 
– Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorensicherheit, to reassess the risks of nuclear 
energy production. The resulting report (Weiterleitungsnachricht-WLN), in 
combination with the wide-spread disapproval of the public opinion, and 
recommendations from several organizations (such as the Ethical Review Committee 
for Safe Energy Supply – Sichere Energieversorgung) led the German Federal 
Government to take the decision to abandon industrial nuclear energy generation, and 
to do so as fast as possible (BMUi, 2012). The German Government decided to shut 
down 8 of the 17 nuclear power plants as a precautionary reaction to the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident. The German Bundestag accordingly enacted a three months 
moratorium to reevaluate the safety standards of all operating commercial power 
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plants in the country. The operational prolongations established in the 11
th
 
Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act were immediately suspended and the 7 plants 
older than 1981 and Krümmel KKK were temporarily decommissioned (Bredberg I. , 
Hutter, Kühn, & Dose, 2012). It is important to mention that the plants Brunsbüttel 
KKB and Krümmel KKK had already been in non-performance mode due to 
technical issues. In consequence, the power plants Biblis A, Biblis B, Isar KKI 1, 
Neckarwestheim GKN I, Philippsburg KKP and Unterweser KKU were phased out 
and Brunsbüttel KKB and Krümmel KKK were not brought back into operation. 
(Bredberg I. , Hutter, Kühn, & Dose, 2012).  
 
In the 13
th
 amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 2011, the German Bundestag 
decided with an overwhelming majority of 513 votes (compared to 79 no-votes and 8 
abstentions) to abandon all operating nuclear power plant by 2022 (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2011). Such an  overpowering consensus had rarely been seen in the 
Parliament and it brought together almost all the major represented parties, including 
the governing CDU and FDP and the big opposition parties SPD and Bündinis 90’ die 
Grünen (Zeit Online, 2011). Only one bigger political fraction, Die Linke, voted 
against the 13
th
 Amendment. The former Minister for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Dr. Norbert Röttgen, emphasized in a speech in 
front of the Bundestag the particularity of this seldom mutual consent, emphasizing 
that the agreement would represent a turn in the German energy-policy debate that 
had been ongoing for over 30 years (Zeit Online, 2011). At this point, it is important 
to note that the German Bundestag had decided an extension for the running life of 
German nuclear power plants in Autumn 2010 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010). In fact, 
only few months before the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the German Bundestag had 
decided, in the course of the 11
th
 Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, to prolong 
the life time of the power plants older than 1980 by 8 years and the lifetime of the 
post-1980 plants by 14 years (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010; Deutscher Bundestag, 
2010; Deutscher Bundestag, 2010(b)).  
 
The German Bundestag passed the 13
th
 Amendment of the German Atomic Energy 
Act on the 31
st
 of July, 2011, four months after the Fukushima accident, and the 
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revision came into effect on the 6
th
 of August, 2011. On the effective date of the legal 
validity of the Amendment, the eight nuclear power plants that had hitherto been 
phased off were permanently shut down. In addition, the Amendment determined that 
the remaining nine nuclear power plants were to be phased out by the year 2022 
(Bredberg I. , Hutter, Kühn, & Dose, 2012). More precisely, the nuclear power plant 
Grafenrheinfeld KKG has been planned to be phased out by the end of the year 2015, 
Gundremmingen KRB B by the end of 2017, Philippsburg by the end of 2019, 
Grohnde, Gundremmingen C and Brokdorf by the end of 2021 and Isar 2, Emsland 
and Neckarwestheim by December 31th, 2022 (atw, 2012). The life span extension 
decided in 2010 and the additional electricity volumes added in 2010 were canceled. 
Additionally, the current legislation, since the 12
th
 amendment of the act in September 
2010, does not prescribe the commissioning of new commercial nuclear power plants 
(DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014; Bredberg I. , et al., 2014).  
In 2011, the gross electricity production of Germany’s 17 nuclear power plants 
decreased by -23,2 % from 140,556 TWh (2010) to 107,971 TWh. The gross capacity 
of those power plants is 8.821 MW (net capacity: 8.433 MW). Therefore, Germany 
lost approximately 41% of their gross installed capacity. According to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2013), the 9 remaining German nuclear 
power plants had a gross capacity of  12.696 MWe and produced 97,141 TWh (net) in 
2013.  (Bredberg I. , Hutter, Kühn, & Dose, 2012; atw, 2012). 
3.3.3. Current Status of the German reactors 
Despite the initiated nuclear shut down and the reduction from 17 nuclear reactors to 9, 
Germany’s nuclear capacity still remains one of the worlds' largest. Moreover, there are 
currently only twelve other countries with a higher numbers of operating, commercial 
nuclear reactors in the world: The United States of America with 100 reactors, the French 
Republic with 58 reactors, the State of Japan with 59 reactors, the Federal Republic of 
Russia with 33, the Republic of Korea with 23 reactors, the Republic of India with 21 
reactors, The People’s Republic of China with 22 operating reactors and 28 under 
construction, Canada with 19 reactors, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland with 16 reactors, Ukraine with 15 and Sweden with 10 operating reactors
1
 (DAtF 
- Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014 (b)). In fact, in 2013, Germany’s gross capacity 
                                                          
1
 Status December 2013, According tot he DAtF – Deutsches Atomforum e.V 
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accounted for 3,183 per cent, the net capacity for 3,192 percent and the gross production 
for 3,897 per cent of the global capacities or gross production
2
. (DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2014) 
 
In 2013, nine nuclear reactors with a gross capacity of 12.696 MWe were still in 
operation. This included seven Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) with a capacity of 
10.008 MWe and two Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) with a capacity of 2,688 MWe. As 
mentioned above, eight reactors, 4 PWRs (4.775 MWe) and 4 BWRs (4.046 MWe) were 
already in their final shut down process (Bredberg I. , et al., 2014). Furthermore, the 
German nuclear landscape counted 16 reactors under decommissioning, three reactors 
were already entirely dismantled and six projects were initiated, but never reached 
criticality. At this point
3
, no decommissioning process had been initiated for the eight 
reactors shut down in August 2011 (I.E.A - International Energy Agency, 2013; Bredberg 
I. , et al., 2014).   
                                                          
2
 Global gross capacity: 398.861 MWe, Global net capacity: 378.070 MWe, Global gross production: 2.364,16 
TWh net (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014) 
3
 Status as of December 2013 (IAEA, 2013) 
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Table 1: Nuclear Power Plants in Germany 2013 (Bredberg I. , et al., 2014; atw, 2012; Bredberg I. , Hutter, Kühn, & Dose, 
2012) 
Power plant 
Gross 
electrical 
capacity 
Reference 
unit power 
Location 
First Grid 
connection 
Status 
Production 
2010 2011 2013 
Unit 
MW 
(Gross) MW (Net) 
   
GWh 
(net) 
GWh 
(net) 
GWh (net) 
Biblis A 1225 1167 Hesse (Bilblis) 25.08.1974 
Permane
nt 
shutdow
n 
4.675,88 2.111,28 0 
Biblis B 1300 1240 Hesse (Biblis) 25.04.1976 
Permane
nt 
shutdow
n 
9.726,62 1.683,99 0 
Brokdorf KBR 1480 1410 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
(Osterende) 14.10.1986 
Operatio
nal 
(31.12.2
019) 
11.360,45 9.701,25 11.146,17 
Brunsbüttel 
KKB 806 771 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
(Brunsbüttel) 13.07.1976 
Permane
nt 
shutdow
n 
0 0 0 
Emsland KKE 1400 1329 
Lower Saxony 
(Lingen) 19.04.1988 
Operatio
nal 
(31.12.2
022) 
10.977,91 10.971,12 10.912,11 
Grafenrheinfel
d KKG 1345 1275 
Bavaria 
(Schweinfurt) 30.12.1981 
Operatio
nal 
(31.12.2
015) 
7.492,57 8.532,31 9.664,79 
Grohnde 
KWG 1430 1360 
Lower Saxony 
(Grohnde) 05.09.1984 
Operatio
nal 
(31.12.2
019) 
10.782,44 9.609,19 10.420,06 
Gundremming
en KRB B 1344 1284 
Bavaria 
(Gundremming
en) 16.03.1984 
Operatio
nal 
(31.12.2
017) 
9.460,79 10.320,08 9.647,36 
Gundremming
en KRB C 1344 1288 
Bavaria 
(Gundremming
en) 02.11.1984 
Operatio
nal 
(31.12.2
019) 
10.394,76 9.454,97 10.015,72 
Isar KKI 1 912 878 
Bavaria 
(Essenbach) 03.12.1977 
Permane
nt 
shutdow
6.285,18 1.561,10 0 
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n 
Isar KKI 2 1485 1400 
Bavaria 
(Essenbach) 22.01.1988 
Operatio
nal 
(31.12.2
022) 
11.375,28 11.655,84 11.402,05 
Krümmel 
KKK 1402 1346 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
(Geesthacht) 28.09.1983 
Permane
nt 
shutdow
n 
0 0 0 
Neckarwesthei
m GKN I 840 785 
Baden-
Würtenberg 
(Neckarwesthei
m) 03.06.1976 
Permane
nt 
shutdow
n 
1.910,34 188,66 0 
Neckarwesthei
m GKN II 1400 1310 
Baden-
Würtenberg 
(Neckarwesthei
m) 03.01.1989 
Operatio
nal 
(31.12.2
022) 
10.180,30 10.807,79 10.218,74 
Philippsburg 
KKP 1 926 890 
Baden-
Würtenberg 
(Philippsburg) 05.05.1979 
Permane
nt 
shutdow
n 
6.448,68 1.415,29 0 
Philippsburg 
KKP 2 1468 1402 
Baden-
Würtenberg 
(Philippsburg) 17.12.1984 
Operatio
nal 
(31.12.2
019) 
11,192,14 10.727,21 8.714,52 
Unterweser 
KKU 1410 1345 
Lower Saxony 
(Stadland) 29.09.1978 
Permane
nt 
shutdow
n 
10.698,9 2.369,34 0 
Total 21517 20480       
133.002,2
4 
101.058,4
3 
92.141,52 
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3.3.4. Organization and Structure of the German Nuclear Power Industry 
Germany’s basic law, the 
Grundgesetz, determines that the 
German Federal Government holds 
the legislative authority regarding 
the peaceful utilization of nuclear 
technologies and, on the other hand, 
allocates the execution of Federal 
law in this regard to the Federal 
Lands (Länder). However, the 
Federal Lands’ executive power is 
subject to exceptions and controlled 
by the Federation. The Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation, Building and 
Nuclear Safety (BMUB) has been 
assigned with the supreme authority 
for affairs regarding nuclear safety 
and radiological protection and is 
consequently responsible for the 
supervision of lawfulness and expediency of the Federal Lands' related executive activities. 
The main federal legislative basis for nuclear regulation was constituted by the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1959
4
, which has since been changed and updated by thirteen amendments to 
this day. (BMUB - German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, 
Building and Nuclear Safety, 2015; I.E.A - International Energy Agency, 2013) 
According to the Act on the Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy and the protection against 
its Hazards (Atomic Energy Act), the main purpose of the law is: 
“(1) to phase out the use of nuclear energy fort the commercial generation of electricity in 
controlled manner, and to ensure orderly operation up until the date of termination, (2) to 
protect life, health and real assets against the hazards of nuclear energy and the harmful 
effects of ionising radiation and to provide compensation for damage caused by nuclear 
                                                          
4
 Atomgesetz from 1959 
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Figure 4: Hierarchy of the National Regulations and the Issuing 
Authorities (BMUB - German Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, 2015) 
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energy or ionising radiation, (3) to prevent danger to the internal or external security of the 
Federal Republic of Germany from application or release of nuclear energy or radiation, (4) 
to enable the Federal Republic of Germany to meet its international obligations in the field of 
nuclear energy and radiation protection (BfS - Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, 2013, S. 3).“  
 
In addition to the Atomic Energy Act, there are a number of generally binding federal 
regulations and laws to regulate and administer the peaceful use of nuclear technologies in 
Germany, which are as follows: the Precautionary Radiation Protection Act, the Radiation 
Protection Ordinance, the Nuclear Licensing Procedure Ordinance, the Nuclear Financial 
Security Ordinance, the Repository Prepayment Ordinance, the Nuclear Reliability 
Assessment Ordinance, the Nuclear Safety Officer and Reporting Ordinance, and the Nuclear 
Waste Shipment Ordinance. (IAEA, 2013) 
 
The Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz (BfS), the Federal Office for Radiation Protection, 
supports the BMUB with technical and scientific advice regarding radiation protection, 
nuclear safety and nuclear waste management. In addition, the Office assists the ministry in 
the execution of federal oversight and a number of administrative and representative tasks 
(BMUB - Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear 
Safety, 2013). In order to assure independent, qualified and comprehensive evaluations, the 
BMUB is supported by the advisory commissions Reactor Safety Commission (RSK
5
), the 
Commission for Radiological Protection (SSK
6
) and the Nuclear Waste Management 
Commission (ESK
7
) (BMUB - Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, 
Building and Nuclear Safety, 2013; BMUB - Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, 2012). These Commissions are aimed at 
providing the BMUB with unbiased and comprehensive recommendations and scientific 
comments and at promoting technical progress in the field of safety. It should however be 
noted that the members of the advisory commissions are assigned by the BMUB (BMUB - 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, 
2012). Furthermore, the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA
8
) defines precise safety 
                                                          
5
 RSK: Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission 
6
 SKK: Strahlenschutzkommission  
7
 ESK: Entsorgungskommission  
8
 KTA: Kerntechnischer Ausschuss  
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standards for nuclear operations. This commission is affiliated with the BfS and represents 
five groups of stakeholders: operators, experts, manufacturers, federal- and state authorities 
and representatives of public interests. In fact, each of these groups is represented by seven 
votes and new standards have to be approved by twenty-eight members in order to be 
approved. This system had been set up to ensure that no stakeholder group, provided that they 
vote in unison, could be overruled (BMUB - Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, 2013; IAEA, 2013). 
As mentioned, in accordance with the Basic Law and the Atomic Energy Act, the Federal 
Lands are responsible for the execution of national laws and regulations regarding nuclear 
power. Two of the utmost important 
tasks in this regard, are the licensing 
and supervision of domestic power 
plants. The Federal Land government 
may therefore nominate the 
responsible executive Federal Land 
authorities. The seventeen German 
reactors, including those shut down 
in 2011, are located in five different 
German Federal Lands, namely 
Baden-Würtenberg, Bavaria, Hesse, 
Lower Saxony and Schleswig-
Holstein (atw, 2012).  
Figure 5: Status and Location of 
Germany's Nuclear Power Plants end 
of 2011- Retrieved  from IAEA (2013, 
p. 65), based on Bredberg I. , et al., 
(2014) illustrates the Status and 
Location of Germany's Nuclear 
Power Plants end of 2011 and shows 
the geographical sites of both, the 
operational reactors and those which 
were shut down until 2013. The Federal Land of Baden-Würtenberg has four reactors within 
Figure 5: Status and Location of Germany's Nuclear Power Plants end of 
2011- Retrieved  from IAEA (2013, p. 65), based on Bredberg I. , et al., 
(2014) 
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its borders, Neckarwesteheim 1 and Philippsburg 1, both shut down in 2011 and 
Neckarwesteheim 2 and Philippsburg 2, which are both still operational. The licensing 
authority
9
 and supervising authority have both been held by the Ministry for the Environment, 
Climate Protection and Energy Sector of Baden Würtenberg. Isar 1 and 2, Grafenrheinfeld, 
Grundremmingen B and C are located in Bavaria and the licensing authority
10
 and 
supervisory authority are subject to the Bavarian State Ministry of the Environment and 
Public Health. The Biblis A and Biblis B reactors, both had been shut-down in 2011, are 
located in Hesse and are therefore under the authority (licensing and supervisory) of the 
Hessian Ministry of the Environment, Energy, Agriculture and Consumer Protection. In 
Lower Saxony, the operational reactors Grohnde and Emsland and the shut-down reactor 
Unterweser (2011) are regulated by the Lower Saxon Ministry for Environment and Climate 
Protection. Lastly, the Ministry of Energy Transition, Agriculture, Environment and Rural 
Areas Schleswig Holstein oversees licensing and supervision of the local reactors Brunsbüttel, 
Krümmel (shut-down in 2011) and Brokdorf. (IAEA, 2013) 
3.3.5. Nuclear Reactor Design in Germany 
Germany’s remaining operational commercial nuclear reactors and those shut-down in 2011 
can be subdivided into two main technologies, the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and the 
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). Today, there are seven PWRs and two BWRs in operation, 
whereas four PWRs and four BWRs had been shut down in 2011 (IAEA, 2013). In order not 
to go beyond the scope of this paper, the following chapter will be limited to these two fission 
based thermal reactor technologies, which are the only existing designs for commercial 
power generation in Germany. However, it is important to state that this only covers a part of 
today’s nuclear reactor designs (Choppin, Rydeberg, & Liljenzin, 1995; DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2014).  
Even though there has been significant progress in developing new technological approaches 
for nuclear power, the vast majority of the world’s nuclear power plants in commercial 
service are based on fission of the Uranium 235 (
235
U) isotope. Obviously, 
235
U is not the 
only fissile element
11
; however, it is the most used nuclear fuel today (Bonin & Royer, 2014). 
                                                          
9
 The licensing authority is held in agreement and cooperation with the Minsitry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs and the Ministry of Interior of Baden-Würtenberg (IAEA, 2013) 
10
 The licensing authority is held in agreement and cooperation with the State Ministry of the Economy, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Technology (IAEA, 2013) 
11
 Examples for other fissile isotopes: 
233
U (produced from 
232
Th), 
239
Pu (produced from 
238
U) or 
241
Pu 
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Natural uranium usually consists of 99,3% of 
238
U and in consequence 
235
U represents a 
minimal share of 0,7% (Narbel, Hansen, & Lien, 2013; Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 
2013). PWRs and BWRs usually need a minimum share of 2% 
235
U; consequently, natural 
uranium has to be enriched in processing plants by a complex procedure (Volkmer, 
Kernenergie Basiswissen, 2013). In order to ensure a controlled nuclear chain-reaction, a 
sufficient number of neutrons is needed (Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 2013). During 
the fission process, a neutron hits the 
235
U isotope and consequently transforms it into 
236
U, 
which on the other hand fissions into two daughter products (for example: Barium (
139
Ba) and 
Krypton (
94
Kr), or Cesium 
140
Cs and Rubidium 
93
Rb), under the release of two to three 
neutrons (Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 2013; Royer, 2014). This reaction
12
 releases 
kinetic energy of approximately 195 MeV
13
 (Royer, 2014). The probability to capture the 
released neutrons highly depends on their kinetic energy. In general, the slower the neutrons 
are, the higher is the probability of further fission of 
235
U isotopes. Therefore, the fast 
neutrons, often released with a kinetic energy between 0,1-2,0 MeV, have to be decelerated to 
thermal neutrons with less than 0,1 MeV (Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 2013). In order 
to decelerate fast neutrons, moderator substances, such as Hydrogen (
1
H), Deuterium (
2
De), 
Carbon (
12
C), Beryllium (
9
Be), or Uranium (
238
U) may be used. However, the energy transfer 
is in principal higher when the fast neutrons collide with light nuclei
14
 (Royer, 2014). In 
practice such moderators, which enable a fast slowdown with few collisions and a minimum 
absorption of neutrons, are chosen. The fuel and the moderator are either mixed, in so-called 
homogenous reactors or may be separated, in heterogeneous reactors (Volkmer, Kernenergie 
Basiswissen, 2013). The chain reaction in nuclear fission reactors, in order to be maintained, 
has to be controlled by neutron absorbers. Hence, thermal reactor design comprises regulation 
rods, allowing them to reach exactly the 
critical state.  
 
Radiation is a consequence of nuclear break-
up due to excess of energy or mass. Three 
different forms of radiation may be released: 
                                                          
12
  n+235U => 140Cs+93Rb+3n  (or n+235U => 140Cs+93Rb+3n) 
13
 𝑛 + 𝑈92
235 → 𝐵𝑎56
139 + 𝑈36
94 + 3𝑛 + 𝐸                                                                                                                             
𝐸 ≈ 139 + 8,3 + 94 + 8,8 − 235 + 7,6 ≈ 195𝑀𝑒𝑉   (Bonin & Royer, 2014) 
14
 Hydrogen (1H), Deuterium (2De), Carbon (12C) 
Figure 6: Insulation of Alpha-, Beta- and Gamma Radiation 
by different matters according to Bonin and Royer (2014, p. 
7) 
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Alpha radiation (the release of 𝐻2
4 ), Beta radiation (positron release ( 𝛽+)  due to the 
transformation of protons into neutrons or the transformation of a neutron into a proton 
releasing an electron (𝛽−)) and Gamma radiation, an electro magnetic wave of high energy. 
In order to shield the outside from radiation, different matters are used (Royer, 2014). 
Whereas Alpha radiation is fairly simply to isolate, Beta radiation requires a barrier made of 
aluminum (
13
Al) or concrete and Gamma radiation a sufficient layer of lead (
82
Pb). In 
consequence, thermal reactors are equipped with barriers for radiation protection and the 
retention of radioactive matter. (Royer, 2014; Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 2013; 
Narbel, Hansen, & Lien, 2013). 
 
 Both, the Pressurised Water Reactor design and the Boiling Water Reactor design are 
thermal reactors. Thermal reactors consist of five main components, which allow a controlled 
nuclear reaction: (1) Sufficient supply of fissile material, (2) substance for moderation, (3) 
Control Rods to capture neutrons, (4) a medium for heat transfer from the nuclear core to 
outside and (5) barriers for radiation protection and the retention of radioactive matter. 
(Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 2013) 
 
  
 
   
 
 
Heated Medium 
Low-Temperature 
Medium 
(1) 
(3) 
(4) 
(2) 
(5) 
Figure 7: The Main Principle of Thermal Nuclear 
Reactors - Own Illustration based on (Volkmer, 2013, p. 
39) 
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3.3.5.1. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) 
PWRs are, as BWRs, classified as Second Generation nuclear power plants and these two 
designs represent the vast majority of operational reactors in the world (Royer, 2014). In the 
case of Pressurized Water Reactors the moderator substance is hot highly pressurized water 
(𝐻2𝑂), which is also used as the substance for cooling. In fact, the heat generated by the 
nuclear fuel elements is dissipated by highly pressurized water. Taking the Brokdorf-reactor 
as an example
15
, the system pressure is increased to 157 Bar and constantly regulated by a 
pressurizer. The water in the cooling circuit enters the core of the reactor with a temperature 
of 291°C and leaves it with 326°C. In the Brokdorf reactor, 67.680t of coolant is processed in 
each hour of operation. The main differences in the PWR design are the two separated 
circuits; one cooling the reactor’s core with highly pressurized water, and a second, detached 
circuit generating steam. The heated, pressurized 𝐻2𝑂 of the primary circuit gives off heat to 
the separated secondary circuit via pressurizers. It is important to note that only heat, no 
water is exchanged between the two circuits. Thus, the radioactive matter from the primary 
circuit is shielded off and cannot reach the turbines or the capacitor. As with other kinds of 
thermal power plants, the steam generated is used to power turbines in the generator, 
                                                          
15 Not all PWR are identical in technology, however the main technological concept for those reactors in operation in 
Germany does not differ significantly. 
Figure 8: Example of the Brokdorf Nuclear Reactor – Retrieved from Volkmer (2013) with own translation 
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consequently transforming mechanical energy into electrical energy. In the case of the 
Brokdorf generator, a three-phase synchronous generator four pressurisers generate enough 
steam to power a turbine, which has a gross capacity of 1.480 MW. The capacitor liquefies 
the steam leaving the turbine. In fact, this requires massive amounts of 𝐻2𝑂. In order to cool 
the Brokdorf reactor, approximately 208.000 cubic meters of water are extracted from the 
river Elbe per hour of operation. After condensation the pre-heater increases the temperature 
to 218°C and the water is reverted to the steam generator. In order to guarantee shielding 
from radiation, a pressure vessel of 25 cm wall thickness of special steel coats the nuclear 
fuel elements, which is, together with the primary circuit, further encased by a double-walled 
containment (Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 2013, pp. 50-51). 
3.3.5.2. Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) 
Even though the design of a Boiling Water Reactor is very similar in most aspects to PWR-
technology, it comprises only one single circuit with water. As the name implies, the water is 
heated to temperature of ebullition in the core of the reactor. After the generated steam is 
separated from the water, it is directly delivered to the turbine. In the case of the German 
Gundremmingen C reactor 7.477 tons of steam, at 286°C and under almost 70 Bar pressure, 
are processed per hour of operation. Since this design uses only one circuit and radioactive 
contaminant may reach the generator segments, the turbine house needs to be shielded off by 
the containment (Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 2013, pp. 49-50). 
 
Figure 9: BWRs- Example of the Gundremmingen Block C Reactor – Retrieved from Volkmer (2013, p. 49) with own 
Translation 
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3.3.6. Safety standards in Germany 
3.3.6.1. Germany’s Fundamental Safety Concept 
As already described in an earlier chapter, the use of nuclear technology is strictly bound to 
peaceful operations and the planning, construction, operation and decommissioning is strictly 
regulated. There are two very important concepts in place to ensure high safety standards. 
First, the Barrierenkonzept determines that nuclear reactors have to be equipped with a 
number of protective barriers to avoid the leakage of radioactive matter and to shield 
radiation. Whereas, Alpha- and Beta radiation are sufficiently isolated by the surrounding 
cooling water, further measures are necessary to ensure the shielding of Gamma radiation. 
Hence, each German thermal reactor needs to have the following retaining layers: (1) crystal 
lattice surrounding the fuel rods to shield a major part of the fission products (2) metallic cans 
coating the fuel rods, (3) pressure vessels, (4) the 
concrete shielding of the core, (5) the reactor 
containment and the armored concrete coating. In 
fact this multiple barrier concept reduces the 
remaining radiation to a minimum outside the 
reactor, and on the other hand protects the reactor 
from external impacts. (DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2013; Volkmer, Kernenergie 
Basiswissen, 2013) 
Furthermore, in addition to this barrier design 
related concept, the German nuclear safety policy 
stipulates the concept of defence in depth by four 
security levels. According to the BMUB - Federal 
Ministry for the Environment Nanture 
Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (1998), 
the aim of this framework is to conduct all 
necessary safety measures to avoid or reduce malfunction to the highest possible degree of 
implausibility and, on the other hand, to provide an adequate framework of countermeasures 
in case of incidents or accidents. Therefore, this framework postulates failure and assumes 
that, even though all due diligence may be applied, technical malfunction may occur (DAtF - 
Figure 10: Reactor Safety Barriers in Germany – Retrieved 
from The German Atomic Forum (2013, p. 11) with own 
translations 
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Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013). In other words, risk of technical failure has to be taken 
into account, and in case of failure on one security level, the superordinate security level has 
to provide the adequate safety measures to absorb the consequences. Assuming the normal 
operating state, the measures of the first security level aim to reduce risk of failure by high 
technological standards and strict quality controls for components or modules used for 
construction, operation or maintenance of nuclear reactors (Volkmer, Kernenergie 
Basiswissen, 2013; DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013). In addition, all workforce 
involved has to be regularly instructed and their performance reviewed. According to the 
German Atomic Forum (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013), this comprehensive 
supervising system has resulted in a low number of operational disorders and a consequently 
high availability of German reactors. 
In case of abnormalities during operation, the second security level was designed to reduce 
the consequences of malfunction to a minimum. Therefore, the reactors’ operating systems 
are equipped with a dense network of control- and monitoring systems to detect and 
counteract any malfunction. However, it is important to note that this state is still specified as 
normal operation. (BMUB - Federal Ministry for the Environment Nanture Conservation, 
Building and Nuclear Safety, 1998; DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013) 
The third security level postulates the case of disturbance. During the planning- and 
construction process, Germany’s fundamental safety concept has been designed to assume the 
most unfavorable circumstances and therefore determine several important principles in order 
to provide comprehensive safety measures to avoid negative consequences (DAtF - 
Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013).  
First, the Duplication-principle (Redundanzprinzip), determines that all safety installations 
have to be installed manifold and have to consist of identical independent subsystems. This 
principle ensures that, even if one safety installation fails, another identical installation 
provides a back-up system.  
Secondly, the Diversity-principle (Diversitätsprinzip) requires a range of heterogeneously 
working systems for each individual safety measure.  
Third, the Segregation-principle (Entmaschung) postulates that individual safety measures 
are subject to spatial separation; that they are particularly protected by their construction 
45 
 
 
technology and that all sub-systems are decoupled. In consequence, even if a safety system is 
threatened or non-functional due to fire or flooding, this principle helps to avoid the spill over 
to other installations (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013; I.E.A - International Energy 
Agency, 2013). According to the German Atomic Forum (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 
2013), this principle is of utmost importance when comparing German nuclear reactors and 
the Fukushima-Daiichi reactor, since the latter had neither sufficient constructional protection, 
nor did the reactor design adhere to the spatial separation of emergency back-up generators 
from other safety measures. Another important standard is the Fail-Safe-Principle (Fail-Safe-
Prinzip), which determines that in particular emergencies, such as the black out of the 
electricity supply, reactors have to switch autonomously into a safe state. One of the greatest 
dangers in emergency situations has been the reliance on human decision-making under 
stressful conditions. To counteract potential incorrect decisions due to stress, all German 
reactors have to be equipped with automated control and communication systems (DAtF - 
Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013).  
According to the Principle of Automated Control and Communication Systems (Prinzip der 
Automatisierten Leittechnik), safety measures in case of an emergency have to be automated 
to a degree that no human interaction is needed within the first thirty minutes after a 
disturbance. Protection systems of German reactors monitor and control most important 
activities regarding the operation of reactors and have to automatically initiate safety 
measures when limits are exceeding certain margins (Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 
2013).  
Furthermore, the Principle of Autarchy (Autarkieprinzip) implies that, in case of emergency, 
German reactors have to be able to rely on distinct and appropriate emergency power supply 
in order to maintain all necessary safety measures for a certain amount of time and without 
any external power supply (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013).  
Finally, the Quality-Control Principle ascertains that during the planning-, construction- and 
operation- phases, inspections have to be conducted (BMUB - Federal Ministry for the 
Environment Nanture Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, 1998; DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2013).  
The fourth security level postulates specific and improbable incidents and comprises safety 
measures to minimize remaining risks. This comprises precautionary measures and accident 
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management in order to limit any accident’s impact to the reactor. However, the concept of in 
depth defence acknowledges a certain residual risk of incidents, which is beyond the four 
security levels. According to the BMUB (1998), the likelihood for such accidents is 
extremely rare to practically impossible. In case of such major accidents, impacting 
surrounding areas, the policy framework determines measures for disaster control and civil 
protection. (BMUB - Federal Ministry for the Environment Nanture Conservation, Building 
and Nuclear Safety, 1998; DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013) 
According to the binding Nuclear Safety Officer and Reporting Ordinance - AtSMV
16
 (BfS - 
Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, 2013), plant operators are obliged to report incidents to their 
supervising authorities. Three major categories of reportable incidents are therefore 
distinguished: Category S (immediate), Category E (urgent) and Category N (normal) (BfS - 
Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, 2013). Category N comprises all such incidents where at least 
one sub-safety system is out of order. Category E on the other hand, includes such cases 
where only the minimum necessary safety systems are performing. Category S incidents 
comprise those where less than the necessary minimum number of safety subsystems are 
operating and such cases have to be reported immediately (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 
2013). 
In addition, Germany introduced the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 
(INES) in 1991 (DAtF - 
Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 
2013). This system, designed by 
the IAEA, represents a 
voluntary and globally used 
common framework for 
reportable incidents and 
accidents regarding the use, 
transfer or storage of radioactive 
matter. According to the IAEA 
(2014), the INES framework 
consists of a scale with eight 
                                                          
16
 AtSMV: Atomrechtliche Sicherheitsbeauftragten-und Meldeverordnung 
Figure 11: INES Framework according to the IAEA (2015, S. 1) and a Count of 
Germany's Events Subject to Report 1991-2012 according to the German Atomic Forum 
(2013, p. 27) 
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different levels, depending on an event’s impact on: “(1) people and the environment, (2) 
radiological barriers and control and (3) defence in depth (IAEA - International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 2015).”  
The eight different levels illustrate if there is no significance for safety (0) or if there is an 
incident (level 1-3) or even an accident (level 4-7) respectively (IAEA - International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 2014). Figure 11: INES Framework according to the IAEA (2015, S. 1) and a 
Count of Germany's Events Subject to Report 1991-2012 according to the German Atomic 
Forum (2013, p. 27) on the previous page shows a more detailed differentiation of the levels 
within the INES framework and the respective number of events that occurred in Germany 
between 1991 and 2012. During this time, 2.996 events were reported in line with both, the 
AtSMV and the INES framework (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013, p. 27). Out of 
these, 2.911 were graded to be Category N (normal), 72 Category E (urgent) and only 3 were 
classified Category S (immediate). Furthermore, the same events were categorized within the 
INES framework to be either with no significance (2.908), anomalies (75) and incidents (3). 
In conclusion, there have been no events, which could be classified as serious incidents or 
even accidents thus far (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2013, p. 27; IAEA - International 
Atomic Energy Agency, 2014).  
3.3.7. Chernobyl and Fukushima 
The accident in unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant remains to be known as the most 
serious accident in the history of peaceful use of nuclear technology (IAEA - International 
Atomic energy Agency, 2015). A more detailed analysis of the impact of the Chernobyl 
accident and its contribution to the development of anti-nuclear norms is assessed 
subsequently.  
This chapter will briefly explain the main incidents and technological circumstances and 
compare it to the German nuclear landscape. On the 25
th
 of April, 1986 the unit 4 RBMK 
1000
17
 reactor was about to be shut down for inspections. During the shutdown process, the 
operator decided to conduct tests to ensure that emergency- and after cooling units would be 
supplied with sufficient electric power during the transition from a blackout of the external 
main power supply and the start-up of the emergency power aggregates (Kerner, Reinhard, & 
Weiß, 2011). In theory, the down-running turbo generators were supposed to supply enough 
                                                          
17
 Reactor Bolschoi Moschtschnosti Kanalny 1000 
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rotational energy to the emergency cooling system until the emergency diesel generator sets 
would be in operation. However, this test’s impact was considered to be limited to the 
reactor’s electro-technical units, without any repercussion on the nuclear technology units 
(Kerner, Reinhard, & Weiß, 2011; NEA - Nuclear Energy Agency / OECD, 2002). In fact, 
the operating staff had not been informed sufficiently by the personnel conducting the test. 
According to an NEA (2002) report, the Personnel’s safety and communication culture was 
inadequate and lacked essential precautionary measures. Furthermore, the authors argue that 
the RMBK 1000 design “made the plant potentially unstable and easily susceptible to loss of 
control in case of operational errors” (NEA - Nuclear Energy Agency / OECD, 2002, S. 10). 
Additionally, the team conducting the test ignored a number of operating regulations by 
avoiding safety devices. After a disturbance in the control system and a drop of the reactor 
output to approximately one per cent, the operating staff would have had to shut down the 
reactor immediately (Kerner, Reinhard, & Weiß, 2011). However, it was decided to increase 
the output to 200 MW of thermal power by extending the control rods. Further, the automatic 
shutdown signal, which is released by the shutdown of the last turbo generator unit, was 
actively disabled (Kerner, Reinhard, & Weiß, 2011). At 1:00 a.m., the reactor had been in a 
severe condition, including an over proportional burn-up of the reactor core, low power 
output with unfavorable power density and problems with the cooling system and the feeding 
water. In reaction to these problems, the operating staff violated multiple operating 
regulations (Kerner, Reinhard, & Weiß, 2011). Nevertheless, the testing team initiated the 
test. In consequence to the shutdown of the four main circulating pumps, the reactor 
temperature and its core void content increased significantly. Few minutes after the test was 
initiated, the reactor was shut down manually but the precedent 
reactor excursion resulted in a disproportional release of energy 
in the fuel assemblies and consequently a manifold of the 
output of the usual nominal capacity (NEA - Nuclear Energy 
Agency / OECD, 2002; Kerner, Reinhard, & Weiß, 2011). The 
surrounding graphite could not moderate the increase of energy 
released and, due to the following rise in pressure, the unit 4 
reactor exploded. The reactor was almost completely destroyed 
and, due to insufficient safety barriers, radioactive matter and 
radiation were released (NEA - Nuclear Energy Agency / 
OECD, 2002) (Kerner, Reinhard, & Weiß, 2011). 
Figure 12: Multi-barrier Principle of 
German Reactors - Retrieved from 
DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V 
(2011) 
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There are a number of reasons why the Chernobyl accident, in the form in which it occurred, 
could not have happened in a German reactor (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2011). As 
explained before, all German nuclear reactors are subject to the concept of multiple barriers 
to shield the reactor through different layers. This includes, most importantly, a compression 
proof and gas thight containment layer, which was not part of the RMBK 1000 reactor design 
(DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2011). In fact an adequate containment may have 
shielded radiactive matter and radiation from leaking. Second, German reactors are equipped 
with an automated regulating rods, allowing a interuption of the nuclear chain reaction within 
few seconds (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2011). Third, German reactors use water as 
both a moderator and cooling substance. An increase of vapor lock therefore leads to a lower 
modarating quality for water, which leads to a efficency drop and a stop of the nuclear chain 
reaction (Choppin, Rydeberg, & Liljenzin, 1995; DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2011).  
The RBMK 1000 reactor on the other hand used graphite as a moderating substance and 
water as coolant. This  self-energizing combination may lead 
to an increased vapor lock, which accelerates the nuclear chain 
reaction (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2011). Lastly, the 
fuel assembly is located in one pressure vessel in German 
BWRs and PWRs, allowing fast emergency cooling. The 
Chernobyl reactor comprises approximately 3.400 fuel units 
separated in 1.700 coolant ducts (DAtF - Deutsches 
Atomforum e.V, 2011). Since the cooling channels were 
destroyed in the explosion of the reactor, the reactor core could 
not be flooded by the emergency cooling system. Furthermore, 
it is important to note the concept of defense in depth, including the safety principles, had not 
been applied in the Former Soviet Union in this form
18
 (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 
2011). This may have prohibited the initial test leading to the accident and would have 
provided thoroughly hierarchized  safety meassures (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 
2011; Volkmer, Kernenergie Basiswissen, 2013).  
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Figure 13: Chernobyl Reactor without 
Containment – Retrieved from (DAtF 
- Deutsches Atomforum e.V (2011) 
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3.3.8. The  Fukushima Daiichi Accident 
Twenty- five years after the Chernobyl accident, Japan was in the spotlight of international 
attention. A disastrous earthquake, attributed a magnitude of nine in the Richter scale, led to a 
series of  tsunamis
19
  with enormous consequences for the Japanese island of Honshu. In fact, 
the earthquake represents the country’s most severe since the beginning of statistical records 
(DAtF, Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2015).  
In general, three conditions have to be fullfilled for tsunamis to occur. Firstly, the magnitude 
has to be at least 6,5 on the Richter scale. Secondly, the tectonic plates have to shift both, 
horizonatlly and vertically. Third, the seismic focus has to be relatively close to sea level. 
According to the GRS (Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), 2015, pp. 6-
7), all three conditions were fullfilled: an earthquake of magnitude of 9 on the Richter scale 
with a vertical shift of the tectonic plates of more than three meters only twenty-five meters 
under the seabed. Approximately 18.000 people lost their lives due to this natural disaster; 
2.600 people are still reported missing and parts of the island’s infrastructure were 
destroyed
20
 (Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), 2015, p. 3).  
The power plant had been commissioned in the late-1960s and was the oldest nuclear reactor 
assembly operated by the former Tokyo Denryko, today known as TEPCO
21
. The powerplant 
comprises six reactor units, ranging from BWR 3 to the BWR 5 series, and all six are 
equipped with containment vessels
22
. The unit one reactor was supposed to be shut-down by 
March 2011, however the supervison authorities extended the authorized life-cycle by ten 
years only in February 2011 (Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), 2015).  
In fact, the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, due to its proximity to the sea, has been equipped 
with protective barriers for tsunamis of 3,1-3,7 meters altitude. TEPCO reassesed this saftey 
barrier concept in the years 2002 and 2008 and considered enhancing the barriers to hold 
tsunamis of 5,7 meters and up to 15 meters respectively. However, these reenforcement 
measures were not carried out, since the findings of the assessments were not considered 
affirmed (Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), 2015, p. 7). 
                                                          
19
 Gravitation waves triggered by earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and similar events 
20
 Status as of September 2013 
21
 TEPCO - Tokyo Electric Power Comapny 
22
 BWR 3, BWR 4, BWR 5 refer to the type of BWR design. In Fukushima the reactor types are the following: 
Unit 1: BWR 3; Units 2,3,4 and 5: BWR 4; Unit 6: BWR 5 
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Today, there is no evidence that the earthquake had a direct distructive imapact of 
significance on one of the reactors (Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), 
2015). At the time of the earthquake, 14:46 on the 11th of March, reactors 4-6 were shut 
down due to maintenance, whereas the reactors 1,2 and 3 were operational. In line with 
Japanese regulation, all operational reactors were automatically shut-down. However, due to 
the earthquake, the Fukushima Daiichi power plant was largely cut off  from the power grid. 
In order to maintain the cooling of the fuel element storage and the reactor cooling system 
(the cooling has to continue after the shutdown due to afterheat), 13 emergency diesel power 
units were started (DAtF, Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2015). Forty-three minutes later, at 
15:27, the first larger tsunami-waves reached the Fukushima-Daichii plant and flooded parts 
of it and resulted in first technical failures. At 15:41, the largest gravitational wave, which is 
estimated to have had a height of approximately 14 metres reached the plant and disabled 
twelve of the thirteen emergency diesel power units. The protective barriers could not 
withstand a wave of such magnitude and and the rooms containing the aggregates were not 
suffiently sealed against floodings. The reactors 1,2,3 and 4 were flooded for several minutes 
and next to the emergency power units, control units and batteries were also destroyed. 
According to the German Atomic Forum (2015, p. 5), the power supply for the aftercooling 
was consequently disabled for the reactors 1,2 and 3 and for the cooling ponds of the reactors 
1-4. On the 12
th
 of March, the cooling curcuit for reactor 1 was not further supplied with  
cooling substance, followed by the breakdown of the cooling system of reactor 3 on the 13
th
 
of March and reactor 2 on the 14th (DAtF, Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2015). Safety 
measures to prevent the failure of the emergency cooling system did not work sufficiently 
and the fuel element claddings of reactors 1-3 overheated. The containment could not 
withstand the increase in pressure, which was due to chemical oxidations of the overheated 
claddings. According to the German Atomic Forum (2015, p. 5), the hydrogen which was 
newly formed from the oxidation, could leak out of the containment vessels of the reactors 
1,2 and 3. Additionally, hydrogen leaking from the vessel of reactor 3 could spread within 
reactor 4 through a connected construction. On the 12
th
 of March, at 15:36 the reactor 1 
building was severly damaged by a hydrogen explosion, followed by explosions in reactor 3 
on March 13th and reactor 4 on March 15th (DAtF, Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2015). Due 
to a partial meltdown of the nuclear fuel rods and insufficient shielding by the containment 
vessels, radioactive matter and radiation were released. After different assesments of the 
events, the Fukushima Daiichi accident was classified as level seven on the INES scale on 
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April 12th. Three different agencies, namely the Nuclear and Industrial Saftey Agency 
(NISA), the Nuclear Saftey Commission (NSC) and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
(JAEA), calculated the amount of radiactive matter release from the Fuksuhima Daiichi plant. 
All three insitutions concluded iodine equivalent numbers exceeding the value benchamrking 
level 7 accidents in the INES scale
23
. According to the GRS (2015, p. 28), the INES scale 
considers accidents from 5 × 1016Becqurel as major acciedents (level 7) and the assessment 
of the NISA stated a value of 3,7 × 1017  Becquerel and NSC and JAEA reported an 
estimation of 6,3 × 1017Becquerel.  
Few days after the beginning of the Fukushima-Daiichi events on March 17th 2011, the 
German Bundestag requested the Federal Government to:  
“… conduct a comprehensive review of the safety requirements for the German nuclear 
power plants. For this purpose, an independent expert commission is to be tasked with 
carrying out a new risk analysis of all German nuclear power plants and nuclear 
installations with consideration of the knowledge available about the events in Japan – 
especially also with respect to the safety of the cooling systems and the external 
infrastructure-as well as of other extraordinary damage scenarios; … (RSK - Reactor Safety 
Commission, 2011, p. 2)” 
The German Federal Government, in line with the Land governments of Baden-Würtenberg, 
Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein authorized the RSK to conduct an in-
depth review of all operational power plants in the country (BMUB - The Federal Minsitry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Saftey, 2014). On the one 
hand, tsunamis could be excluded as a threat for German power plants; however, according to 
Eric Royer (2014) from the French CEA
24
, other natural catastrophes and man-made hazards 
could potentially represent a theoretical threat for those power plants located in Germany. 
The RSK conducted the safety review and assessed the reactor design in Fuksuhima Daiichi, 
attributing it an“inadequate design of these plants to withstand tsunami impacts” (RSK - 
Reactor Safety Commission, 2011, p. 2). Furthermore, the commission stated that “Obviously, 
installations and measured (sic) to prevent hydrogen explosions in the buildings (venting, 
                                                          
23
 The iodine equivalent value helps to summerize the radiological impact of release nuclides 
24
 CEA - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives 
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recombiners, leak tightness of the systems, barriers) were not effective or did not exist (RSK - 
Reactor Safety Commission, 2011, p. 2).” 
Based on their assessment of the Fukushima-Daiichi events the RSK created the “Catalogue 
of requirements for plant specific reviews of German nuclear power plants in the light of the 
events in Fukushima (Japan)” (RSK - Reactor Safety Commission, 2011, p. 2). The 
conclusions of the assessment were as follows (RSK - Reactor Safety Commission, 2011, p. 
13): 
“It follows from the insight gained from Fukushima with respect to the design of these plants 
that regarding the electricity supply and the consideration of external flooding events, a 
higher level of precaution can be ascertained for German plants. 
The RSK has furthermore reviewed the robustness of German plants with respect to other 
important assessment topics. 
The assessment of the nuclear power plants regarding the selected impacts shows that for the 
topic areas considered, there is no general result for all plants in dependence of type, age of 
the plant, and generation. 
The existing plant-specific design differences according to the current state of licensing were 
only partially considered by the RSK. Plants that originally had less robust design were 
backfitted with partly autonomous emergency systems to ensure vital functions. In the 
robustness assessment performed here, this selectivity leads to evidentially high degrees of 
robustness. 
The RSK has derived first recommendations for further analyses and measures from the 
results of the plant-specific review. 
(…)” 
3.3.9. The possibility of Thorium as an alternative 
Thorium is a radioactive element similar to Uranium but is nonetheless different on two main 
accounts. Firstly, thorium is three times as abundant as uranium in the Earth’s crust and 
occurs as the easily exploitable ‘fertile’ 232Th isotope in many countries (IAEA, 2005). 
Secondly, unlike natural uranium, which contains approximately 0.7% ‘fissile’ 235U isotope, 
natural thorium does not contain any fissile material. As such, thorium and thorium-based 
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fuel in metal, oxide, or carbide forms, is used in combination with ‘fissile’ 235U or 239Pu in 
nuclear research and power convertors for conversion to fissile 
233
U, consequently enlarging 
the ‘fissile’ material resources. Thorium, however is not new technology but rather, has 
accompanied the nuclear age itself (Bryan, 2009). In the early years of developing nuclear 
technology, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, there was considerable interest in the 
development of thorium fuels and fuel cycles, especially among countries that sought to 
integrate thorium fuels into their long-term nuclear program to offset limited uranium 
deposits. However, this initial enthusiasm waned in the face of discovery of new uranium 
deposits and their improved availability. Nonetheless, thorium-based fuels have met with 
renewed interest, according to the IAEA (2005) as a result of “the need for proliferation 
resistance, longer fuel cycles, higher burn up and improved waste characteristics.” 
3.3.9.1.  Rationale for Thorium-based fuel cycles 
 
i. Safety 
 
As Bryan (2009) elucidates, thorium fuel builds upon the tradition of Generation III reactors 
which use passive safety features allowing the laws of nature such as gravity and 
thermodynamics to prevent any possible runaway reactions, leakage, or other accidents by 
causing the reactors to shut down and removing the need for human intervention. 
Additionally, ThO2 has higher thermal conductivity and lower co-efficient of thermal 
expansion compared to UO2 (IAEA, 2005).  This, as Bryan (2009) points out is crucial in 
mitigating a possible meltdown scenario since thorium fuel does not burn as hotly as uranium 
allowing it burn longer and more thoroughly.  
 
ii. Security of Supply 
Thorium is widely abundant with an average concentration of 10 particles per million (ppm) 
in the Earth’s crust in many phosphates, silicates, carbonates and oxide minerals—an amount 
nearly triple that of Uranium and which has not been exploited commercially thus far (IAEA,  
2005). The most popular source of thorium is monazite, a mixed thorium rare earth uranium 
phosphate present in many countries in beach or river sands along with heavy minerals such 
as ilmenite, rutile, zircon, sillimenite, and garnet. Currently, the production of thorium is 
predominately as a by-product of rare earth extraction from monazite sand; the mining and 
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extraction of thorium from monazite is easier and significantly different when compared to 
the extraction of uranium from its ores (IAEA, 2005). Monazite sands can be mined by 
dredge mining—an environmentally unobtrusive mining technique that does not involve 
having to go underground and thus the operating and infrastructure costs are less than that of 
a uranium mining operation. 
iii. Increased energy efficiency 
In addition its abundance relative to Uranium, 
232 
Th is a better fertile material than 
238
U in 
thermal reactors—232Th has three times higher thermal neutron absorption cross-section (7.4 
barns) relative to 
238
U (2.7 barns) (IAEA, 2005). The fissile 
233
U, the number of neutrons 
liberated per neutron absorbed is greater than 2.0 over a wide range of thermal neutron 
spectrum, in contrast to 
235
U and 
239
Pu—as such the conversion of 232Th to 233U is relatively 
more efficient than the conversion of 
238
U to 
239
Pu.  
iv. Proliferation-resistance of 232Th-233U  
Additionally, one of the reservations regarding nuclear energy is the simultaneous 
proliferation of nuclear weapon material generated as a by-product of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
It thus follows that public acceptance of nuclear energy, as a significant contributor of 
primary energy is largely contingent on a fuel cycle that is highly proliferation-resistant. 
Accomplishing this goal necessitates both a combination of administrative checks and 
boundaries, as well as mitigating production of any material in a quantity or quality sufficient 
enough to be of prospective military use (IAEA, 2005). Therefore, rectifying the fuel cycle 
itself to avoid residual material that can be used for the generation of nuclear weapons is 
integral to decoupling the prospective danger of nuclear weapon acquisition from the 
development of nuclear power. Thorium based fuels and fuel cycles have inherent 
proliferation resistance due to the formation of 
232
U through reactions with 
232
Th, 
233
Pa and 
233
U. The half life of 
232
U is only 73.6 years; in addition, the daughter products also have a 
short half-life and 
212
Bi and 
208
Tl emit strong gamma radiations: 0.7-1.8 MeV and 2.6 MeV 
respectively. (IAEA 2005) As such, in thorium matrix fuel, instead of plutonium, 
232
U is 
formed in the spent fuel; this ensures high proliferation resistance as a result of the high 
gamma radiation from the daughter products. 
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v. Improved waste profile 
The current ‘once-through’ fuel cycle generates spent nuclear fuel contains lethal radioactive 
material, including nearly 1% plutonium and minor actinides such as curium, americium, and 
neptunium—all of which can be concentrated to produce nuclear weapons (Bryan, 2009). The 
waste from the thorium fuel cycle comprised 
233
U. Bryan (2009) contends that while 
technology to capitalize on its ability to be reprocessed as a fuel in a closed thorium fuel 
cycle is not yet available, it is nonetheless difficult to make bomb materials as a result of its 
natural properties. 
233
U contains isotopic 
232
U, the decay of which generates bi products 
which generate gamma rays significant enough to  
“fry electronics in any conceivable bomb-making mechanism, not to mention being fatal for 
any human being within several meters, making transport of weapons impossible” (Bryan, 
2009).  
Finally, the gamma rays could be easily detected through satellite surveillance. Bryan (2009) 
thus concludes that while bomb fabrication from 
233
U is technically possible, its 
impracticality renders it close to impossible. 
Moreover, as discussed, even though thorium based waste is highly radioactive, the half-lives 
of 
233
U and its daughter products are shorter than the half-lives of the aforementioned 
transuranic waste (TUR) thereby minimizing problems of toxicity and decay heat. (IAEA 
2005, pp. 10) 
vi. Elimination of enrichment phases 
Thorium does not require any conversion or enrichment. It occurs naturally as thorium 
dioxide (ThO2) with no isotopic content. ThO2, which is not fissile, can be transported to the 
fuel fabrication facility where it can then be used to manufacture pellets, rods, and bundles, 
after which it is transported to the reactor (Bryan, 2009). Consequently, the infrastructure 
costs and transport risks that are inherent to uranium are mitigated. 
3.4. Storage – the Achilles heel of Nuclear Power? 
After nuclear fuel has been spent in the reactor, it is removed from the reactor and brought to 
a cooling pond. After the fuel has been stored there, it can be either brought to a final 
repository or be recycled in a fuel reprocessing plant. For part of the radioactive waste, the 
high active waste, adequate final storage facilities have to be provided. The construction of 
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storage facilities and processing plants is complex and costly. Germany’s electric supply 
companies have currently set aside reserves of approximately 36 billion Euros (DAtF - 
Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014 (b)). High active waste represents approximately ten per 
cent of the overall waste in Germany, yet it contains approximately 99% of the radiation. The 
rest of the waste is classified as low-level radioactive waste and medium-level radioactive 
waste (DAtF - Deutsches Atomforum e.V, 2014 (b)). 
The storage of high active waste has to be completely isolated from the cycle of matter of the 
biosphere. In Germany, all types of nuclear waste are to be disposed in deep geological 
formations, surrounded by host rock materials
25
, to ensure low environmental impacts. The 
Gorleben central interim storage facility has been examined as a potential final storage 
facility in Germany. However, the German Federal Government decided in July 2013 to 
initiate a new site selection process by passing the Site Selection Law (StandAG)
26
. The 
Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) is currently in the process, with a high level of 
public attention and participation to find a suitable location (BfS - Bundesamt für 
Strahlenschutz, 2015). 
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26
 StandAG: Standortauswahlgesetz  
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4. Analysis  
4.1. Security of Supply 
 
4.1.1. Terminology: Dispatchable and Intermittent Generating Technologies 
When discussing security of supply, a distinction must be made between dispatchable and 
intermittent generation technologies. Dispatchable technologies include most conventional 
generation technologies such as coal and nuclear which can be controlled by the system 
operator and be turned on or off “depending on their economic attractiveness at every point in 
time to supply both electricity and network reliability services” (Joskow, 2011, p. 238).  This 
implies that the dispatchability refers to a given generation technology’s ability to increase or 
decrease output quickly on demand. Intermittent technologies, on the other hand, include 
sources such as wind and solar which supply electricity on an intermittent basis meaning that 
they could be unintentionally unavailable; for example, generation from these technologies 
could be affected by factors such as “wind speed, wind direction, cloud cover, haze, and other 
weather characteristics” (Joskow, 2011, p. 238). They can thus not be typically controlled or 
economically dispatched by system operators based on economic factors, as opposed to 
dispatchable technologies. Instead, system operators must respond to inherent variability in 
intermittent generation and utilize dispatchable generators to balance supply and demand 
continuously (Joskow, 2011, p. 238). 
4.1.2. Changes in Base Load Generation 
“Base load” refers to a category of demand for electricity encompassing the minimum 
amount consumed at all times over the year, which in the case of Germany is 35 to 40 GW 
(Agora Energiewende, 2013). Agora Energiewende (2013) argues that renewables are 
replacing the role of conventional base load power plants, such as nuclear and coal. The 
report further contends that by 2022, total load (base, mid and peak load) will be covered by 
renewables during many hours throughout the year, necessitating the use of fossil-fuel 
powered plants at times only when there is limited sun or wind. However, these conventional 
plants must adapt to the fluctuating patterns of wind and solar power and thus operate on a 
flexible basis. 
However, this may be complicated in light of German’s nuclear phase-out and the 
concomitant goal of reducing carbon emissions. According to the World Nuclear Association 
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(2015), Germany would need to depend on approximately 25.000 MWe of base-load capacity 
should it wish to proceed with the nuclear phase-out and simultaneously reduce carbon 
emissions. One possible scenario is Germany’s neighbours such as France, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic and Switzerland, through increased nuclear capacity 
especially in France and requisite interconnection, being able to supply the required base-load 
capacity by 2020; however, this would lead to Germany being dependent on neighbours for 
electricity (which would be largely nuclear) (World Nuclear Association, 2015).  While 
baseload capacity will have to be replaced as a result of the nuclear phase-out, the quantity of 
necessary base-load remains unclear (Rolle). Furthermore, from a cost perspective, according 
to the BCG (2014), part of the € 410 billion investment required in the German power sector 
will be needed to make conventional power plants more flexible as they shift from being 
baseload providers to what the BCG report identifies as ‘peaker’ plants needed only during 
times of peak demand. Furthermore, as discussed subsequently in the next chapter on 
Affordability, further integration of renewables would also have to address lower Energy 
Returned on Investment (EROI), especially when storage options have to be taken into 
account. 
4.1.3. Grid Reliability 
4.1.3.1. Generation Adequacy Standard 
Germany currently has a surplus of capacity; however, this could be challenged as a result 
of the nuclear phase-out, especially in Southern Germany. Given bottlenecks in the 
transmission grid development between the North and the South, Southern Germany is 
facing resource adequacy issues in the context of the decommissioning of 5 GW of 
nuclear capacity in 2011 as well as the planned closure of an additional 3,869 MW; this 
could result in an overall negative balance of approximately 5.717 MW by 2018 (RAP, 
2015).  
4.1.3.2. Current SAIDI 
The System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) is a measure of the average 
interruption time per electricity consumer, and is an internationally accepted metric to 
assess grid reliability. In 2013, Germany’s SAIDI value for unplanned interruptions, 
excluding exceptional events, showed an improvement from 15,91 minutes in 2012 to 
15,32 minutes in 2013 (Bundesnetzagentur, 2014).  
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Figure 14: Overview of German SAIDI Values since 2006 (Prepared by authors based on data from the German 
Bundesnetzagentur) 
Furthermore, assessed through SAIDI as a measure of reliability of service, German 
supply is more reliable compared to most other European countries (Figure 15). In 
2012, for example, Germany’s SAIDI score was the third best in Europe. Sopher 
(2015), however claims that even though Germany’s commendable SAIDI figures 
validate the BMWi’s assertion that Germany has managed to ensure one of the 
world’s most reliable electricity supplies despite integrating 70 GW of intermittent 
wind and solar power with an overall share of 25,3% renewables, it does not 
adequately account for the impact of more renewables on future reliability. As an 
example of the same, a concern regarding reliability is grid congestion for both 
Germany and its neighbors due to Germany’s increased integration of renewables. As 
a consequence of insufficient grid infrastructure to handle power production, power is 
diverted to neighboring countries (such as Czech Republic and Poland) resulting in 
unscheduled loop flows and consequent reduction in transmission capacity for these 
countries. According to Czech grid operator CEPS, power grids in these countries are 
stretched to their thresholds and are vulnerable to potential blackouts when output 
increases from wind turbines in northern Germany or the Baltic Sea; the Czech 
Republic for instance, intends on installing security switches near German borders to 
avoid overload (Bauerova & Andresen, 2012). As such, the importance of lines from 
the North to the South of Germany is emphasized to mitigate the risk of internal 
bottlenecks and unscheduled loop flows to neighboring countries.  
Additionally, the input of intermittent renewables will also necessitate significant 
backup capabilities, particularly during winter. In 2012, the Bundesnetzagentur 
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contracted 2,6MV of reserve capacity, compensating these plants for their 
preparedness to generate power should the need arise; even so, the ENTSO-E 
calculated a negative reserve margin of -0.6% reflecting an excess of national demand 
relative to generation, causing greater reliance on imports (Sopher, 2015).  
 
Figure 15: SAIDI Values (unplanned interruptions excluding exceptional events) based on data from CEER (Council of 
European Energy Regulators, 2015) 
4.1.3.3. Smart Metering 
A challenge that the Energy Transition must confront is the bi-directional integration of 
electricity from small and local renewables such as household PV panels. Excesses 
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should be absorbed into the system but when they fall short, the supply should come from 
the grid. As such, this sensitivity to the grid will necessitate modernization in the form of 
smart grids and smart meters to synchronize supply and demand (BMWi). As of 2013, 
approximately 500,000 smart meters have been installed in Germany, but subsequent 
installation could face the following challenges according to RAP (2015):  
i) Meters that comply with new security standards have not been developed yet 
ii) Recommendations from a study by Ernst & Young (E&Y), commissioned by the 
BMWi have not been integrated into a national level roll out plan. Among the 
recommendations, E&Y suggests that while smart meters are cost effective for 
new buildings or those undergoing a major renovation (defined by Directive 
2010/31/EC on the Energy Performance of Buildings) and for final consumers 
with an annual consumption exceeding 6,000 kWh, small consumers should use 
intelligent meters instead within the normal replacement cycle for meters. Unlike 
smart meters, intelligent meters show end consumers their actual energy usage but 
do not communicate said information to utilities. 
iii) Finally, German law permits third parties (companies independent of Distribution 
Service Operators) to serve as metering operators and service providers, as long as 
the devices installed are compliant with regulatory standards.  
4.1.4. Grid Extension 
Gawel et al. (2014) advocate further development of grids and storage as complementary 
components of energy infrastructure to adapt to new needs of a more sustainable energy 
supply in the future. In doing so, the reserve capacity required in addition to the renewable 
capacity will be reduced, and the utilization of feature-dependent renewables such as solar 
and wind will increase. The authors propose that improved coordination between the 
expansion of generation and network infrastructure will facilitate this.  
This belief by Gawel et al. (2014) is echoed in findings of The Boston Consulting Group 
(BCG). In their report, “Germany’s Energiewende – The End of Power Market 
Liberalization?” they consider grid extension as possibly the biggest obstacle for Germany’s 
energy transition, especially as it approaches its deadline for nuclear withdrawal by 2022. 
The BCG Report underpins this in the need to transmit wind generated power from 
Germany’s North to its industrial South as well as for the local integration of solar and wind 
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power. Projections by German transmission-system operators indicate that this would need an 
estimated 3500 km of new construction in new 
corridors as well as the enhancement of 
approximately 5000 km of transmission along 
existing routes (Gerbert, Rubner, Herhold, & 
Steffen, 2014). However, the Report claims that 
progress on grid extension lags behind with only 
15% of planned projects having been completed 
by 2013 and the delaying of commissioning dates 
of 40% of reported projects, in spite of legislation 
to expedite planning and permission procedures, 
largely as a result of local resistance (Gerbert, 
Rubner, Herhold, & Steffen, 2014).  
Four pieces of legislation exist which collectively 
form the basis for the coordinated, accelerated 
and transparent expansion of the grid (BMWi): 
i) Energy Industry Act (EnWG): Ensures 
transparent and coordinated annual grid expansion 
planning for the German high voltage grid determined through a multi-stage 
process 
 
ii) Grid Expansion Acceleration Act (NABEG): Seeks to ease the planning of grid 
expansion projects which involve many federal states or cross national borders—
power line routes are centrally planned and approved by the Federal Network 
Agency after securing early public participation. Additionally, the Federal 
Network Agency has the onus of defining the specific route of the power lines. 
The shift of the planning responsibility from the state to federal level simplifies 
the process and overcomes fragmentation of responsibilities. 
 
iii) Federal Requirement Plan Act (BBPlG): Identifies the priority expansion projects 
basis the Grid Development Plan and the Offshore Grid Development Plan 
Figure 16: Germany's new grids (Source: Reuters. 
2015. Retrieved from: link.reuters.com/veg84w) 
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iv) Power Grid Expansion Act (EnLAG): in addition to the Federal Requirement Plan, 
lists other priority projects which are solely within the responsibility of the federal 
states 
Additionally, concerns also exist regarding the vulnerability of large interconnected grids to 
solar flares
27
. Predictions by NASA forecast that a future solar maximum could result in 
highly energetic solar flares and coronal mass ejecta; this in turn could cause significant 
damage to the power grid (Mills).  
4.1.5. Developing Wind Energy 
Another aspect of the integration of renewables is the development of both on- and offshore 
wind energy to reduce Germany’s dependence on nuclear and fossil fuel power. Currently, 
wind power accounts for 8% of German power supply and the Federal Government intends to 
increase expansion of appropriate rural locations, replace older turbines with modern and 
more powerful turbines (repowering), and gradually expand wind power at sea called 
offshore wind power in the North and Baltic Seas (BMWi). Gross (2011) however contends 
that offshore wind farms are also susceptible to delays because of protests, much like grid 
expansion; sunbathers at beaches in the North Sea and the Baltic do not wish to be 
inconvenienced by turbines which resultantly, have to be built at a minimum distance of 30 
km from the shore.  
Stegen and Seel (2013) contend that while wind firms are optimistic about the potential of 
new turbines and repowering, the same did not extend to offshore wind development. They 
are critical of the feasibility of the German government’s target of achieving 10.000 MW 
offshore capacity by 2020 and 30.000 MW by 2030—attributed to higher costs for offshore 
wind farms and delayed grid expansion. Nonetheless, challenges exist for both onshore and 
offshore wind development. 
For onshore development, they posit that the growth and expansion of onshore wind has 
resulted in prime locations, such as along the coasts of the North and Baltic Seas already 
being predominantly utilized. The next best alternatives are suboptimal and the extent to 
which they can be made more attractive using technological developments is debatable. 
                                                          
27
 The last solar storm occurred in 1859 when the sun experienced a high increase in sun spot activity and a 
sequence of intense solar flares; resultantly, a coronal mass ejection reached the Earth’s atmosphere only 18 
hours after the ejection (Mills). 
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However, even when new sites are found, they need to address public opposition, in the form 
of NIMBY-ism arising from health concerns, property value consequences, and aesthetic 
objections (Stegen & Seel, 2013). Resultantly, Germany also has strict regulations regarding 
the location and height of turbines to mitigate disturbances such as shadow flickering and 
acoustic emissions to the public around wind farms—these regulations are viewed as varying 
degrees of being restrictive by wind firms.    
For offshore wind development, should Germany wish to reach its desired offshore capacity 
of 10,000 MW by 2020, Stegen and Seel (2013) estimate that it will have to erect 
approximately 1950 new 5 MW turbines or 1400 new 7 MW turbines over the next 7 years. 
However, given that Germany had only erected 68 turbines by the end of 2012 with few more 
not connected to the grid, offshore wind development will have to be expedited but it faces 
the following problems (Stegen & Seel, 2013). In addition to delayed grid integration, 
offshore wind farms are placed farther offshore than other countries; for example, German 
turbines must be situated approximately 40 km from the coastline, 17 km more than the 
European average (Stegen & Seel, 2013). Consequently, as a result of being farther into the 
sea, the turbines are more vulnerable to rougher weather. Secondly, offshore development is 
impeded by financing uncertainty due to low rate of return and the reluctance of banks to 
provide financing unless a grid connection exists. 
4.1.6. Storage Capacities 
As mentioned, Germany aims to accomplish a high share of renewables in its electricity mix: 
50% by 2030 and at least 80% by 2050. At the same time, power generation facilities will 
have to be accordingly expanded to account for weather-related, diurnal, and seasonal 
fluctuations especially for wind energy and photo-voltaics (Schill, Diekmann, & Zerrahn, 
2015). The German Energy Transition thus necessitates increasing flexibility in the electricity 
system to balance out electricity supply and demand. In addition to different generation, 
demand, and network based flexibility options, power storage could help in imparting this 
flexibility through different fields of application.  
However, the nature of future power storage requirements is contingent on context. Assuming 
that other generation or demand based options can be at least partially developed, the 
expansion of power storage will not be an obstacle for the Energy Transition in the short to 
medium term (Schill, Diekmann, & Zerrahn, 2015). The underlying implication then is that 
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greater expansion of electricity generation from fluctuating renewables should be able to 
proceed without a significant increase in power storage, at least in the short term.  
However, in the long term, the storage requirements could be different depending on different 
uncertainties. For example, an analysis by DIW Berlin takes into account the arbitrage value 
of storage as well as its contribution to providing control reserves and firm generation 
capacity (Schill, Diekmann, & Zerrahn, 2015). The study concludes that power storage 
requirements could increase significantly with concomitant high shares of renewables. 
Additionally, storage requirements would increase continually if, for instance, relatively even 
generation from offshore wind turbines or demand flexibility was not adequately developed. 
Furthermore, support for power storage could be useful in protecting the energy transition 
given the possibly additional storage required as a result of uncertainties regarding the 
development of demand or generation based flexibility options such as flexible power 
generation from natural gas or biomass. Moreover, given the German government’s 
ambitious targets for climate and energy policy, a high share of renewables might have to be 
integrated sooner than expected thereby requiring investments in storage earlier than 
anticipated in current model calculations.  
At the same time, however, despite the importance of storage and imports in enhancing 
reliability, fossil fuels remain a vital source of backup power to ensure grid reliability, both in 
the long and short run. However, Sopher (2015) claims that the increased influx of 
intermittent renewables is hurting these fossil fuel generators in three ways:  
i) These plants are tapped with a frequency lower than that of previous years 
ii) Lower wholesale prices as a consequence of increased renewables (with lower 
operating costs) also impede firm capacity providers from staying active 
iii)  Market outcomes are becoming difficult to predict due to a combination of 
greater intermittency on the supply side and higher demand participation, energy 
efficiency, and macroeconomic impacts on demand. 
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4.3. Affordability 
4.3.1. LCOE 
One way to measure the costs of electricity generation is what is referred to as the LCOE, the 
Levelized Cost of Electricity. The LCOE concept allows the inclusion of physical and 
technological characteristics of different electricity generation sources. This unit-based 
comparison enables a broad evaluation of the competitiveness of different electricity 
generation technologies by attributing them different costs per kilowatt-hour over the 
estimated life cycle a plant (U.S Energy Information Administration, 2014). According to 
Narbel, Hansen and Lien (2013), a breakdown of the LCOE formula is recommended in order 
to examine the different physical and economic characteristics of generation technologies. 
Furthermore, this approach allows comparison of power plants with different cost structures; 
e.g. the comparison of fuel intense power plants with capital intensive technologies or 
dispatchable conventional power plants with variable renewable sources (Ueckerdt, Hirth, 
Luderer, & Edenhofer, 2012). Therefore, Narbel, Hansen and Lien (2013) propose a 
subdivided assessment of initial investments, operation and maintenance and fuel 
consumption. This approach allows a comparison of the distinct costs and may subsequently 
be accumulated to calculate the LCOE. There are different calculation methods for the 
LCOE; as such, it is important to note that the following examination is entirely based on an 
approach according to Narbel, Hansen and Lien (2013). 
First, the capital costs, representing the initial investments are to be determined. Therefore, 
the cost 𝑐𝑝 is multiplied by the so-called recovery factor R and further divided by the product 
of assessed time period H and the capacity factor f. In fact, the capacity factor is crucial to 
convert 𝑐𝑝, which is usually expressed as monetary units per installed capacity (monetary 
unit/MW), to a comparable unit cost (monetary unit/MWh). The capacity factor represents 
the quotient of the actual power generated and the maximum the power plant could 
theoretically generate within the same period H. This factor is very different for various 
electricity generation sources and may, depending on different geographical and technical 
aspects, range between 9% up to 95%
28
 (Salvatore, 2014). Additionally, the life cycle of 
power plants can vary significantly. Therefore, the LCOE contains the capital recovery rate 
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 9%  for a low estimation of  Solar PV thin film technology up to 95% according to Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance (Salvatore, 2014) 
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R
29
. In order to calculate the capital recovery factor, it is important to find an accurate 
estimation for both, the economic plant life cycle T and the discount rate r (Narbel, Hansen, 
& Lien, 2013). 
Furthermore, operation and maintenance cost 𝑐𝑜  represent all fixed costs. All those costs, 
even-though they may be very different by nature of origin, are summed up and divided by 
the product of the time period H and the capacity factor f. In addition, the result of this term 
will be multiplied by the levelization factor
30
 l to factor in the discount rate, plant life cycle T 
and the escalation rate e. 
The last term represents all costs connected to the consumption of fuel and variable operation 
and maintenance costs
31
. The fuel costs 𝑐𝑓  are, as the operation and maintenance cost 𝑐𝑜 
before, multiplied by the levelization factor l and divided by the product of the time period H 
and the capacity factor f. This part of the LCOE equation can be of particular interest when 
evaluating different technologies regarding their dependence of fuel supply and their price 
volatility. 
Capital costs [
𝑅∗ 𝑐𝑝
𝐻∗𝑓
]  + O&M Costs [𝑙 ∗ (
𝐶𝑜
𝐻∗𝑓
)] + Fuel costs [𝑙 ∗ (
𝐶𝑓
𝐻∗𝑓
)] = 𝐶𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 
As mentioned before, this separate breakdown can be very useful to detect more precise 
origins of the different technologies’ costs, and on the other hand to benchmark different 
technologies based on a more holistic evaluation (Narbel, Hansen, & Lien, 2013). It is of 
utmost importance to note that the LCOE highly depends on the accuracy of the data and 
estimates used for the different parameters. Figure 17: Estimated Levelized Cost 
(EUR/MWh) for Electricity Generation Technologies Entering Service by 2019 (Based on 
E.I.A Data for the US) shows an overview of the most common electricity generation 
technologies, including a distinct breakdown of the levelized capital cost (𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑝), the 
levelized fixed operation and maintenance cost (𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜) and the levelized fuel and 
variable operation and maintenance cost (𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑓). In order to compare technologies at 
a similar state of technology, this graph contains data based on the 2012 LCoE estimates of 
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 𝑅 =  
𝑟∗(1+𝑟)𝑇
(1+𝑟)𝑇−1
 
30
 𝑙 =  
𝑟∗(1+𝑟)𝑇
(1+𝑟)𝑇−1
∗  
(1+𝑒)
(𝑟−𝑒)
∗ [1 − (
1+𝑒
1+𝑟
)
𝑇
] 
31
 Narbel, Hansen and Lien included variable costs connected to operation and maintence in the operation and 
maintenance cost 𝑐𝑜 and not as part of the fuel costs 𝑐𝑓. 
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the U.S Energy Information Administration (2014), assuming this would be the technological 
stage of development of the different power plants potentially entering service by the year 
2019 
32
.  The generation technologies, and the assumed capacity factors f, included are: 
Table 2: Capacity Factors Benchmark According to the U.S Energy Information Administration (2014, p.6) 
Plant Type f (%) Abbreviation 
Dispatachable Technologies     
Conventional Coal 85 Conventional Coal 
Integrated Coal-Gasification Combined Cycle 85 IGCC 
Integrated Coal-Gasification Combined Cycle 
with Carbon Capture and Storage 85 IGCC with CCS 
Natural Gas Fired Conventional Combined 
Cycle 87 NG-Conv. combined Cycle 
Natural Gas Fired Advanced Combined Cycle 87 NG-Adv. Combined Cycle 
Natural Fas Fired Advanced Combined Cycle 
with Carbon Capture and Storage 87 NG-Adv. CC with CCS 
Natural Gas Fired Conventional Combustion 
Turbine 30 NG-Conv. Combustion Turbine 
Natural Gas Fired Combustion Turbine 30 NG-Adv. Combustion Turbine 
Advanced Nuclear 90 Advanced Nuclear 
Geothermal 92 Geothermal 
Biomass 39,5 Biomass 
Limited Dispatchability     
Hydroelectric 53 Hydroelectric 
Non-Dispatchable Technologies     
Wind – Onshore 35 Wind – Onshore 
Wind – Offshore 37 Wind – Offshore 
Solar PV  25 Solar PV  
Solar Thermal 20 Solar Thermal 
 
                                                          
32
 The data is based on the average LCOE numbers in the United States of America for the year 2012 and 
converted from USD to EUR at a rate of: 1USD=0,8789EUR (07.05.2105). 
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Figure 17: Estimated Levelized Cost (EUR/MWh) for Electricity Generation Technologies Entering Service by 2019 (Based on E.I.A Data for the US)
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4.3.2. System LCOE and the issues of variability, uncertainty and location 
specificity  
On the one hand, the LCoE concept represents an advantageous metric to benchmark 
different technologies by their economic competitiveness and on the other, the concept is 
highly sensitive to the accuracy of the assumptions used and contains severe deficits 
regarding other physical parameters. Thus, the LCoE metric misses to examine a large 
number of indirect costs of electricity generation (Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer, & Edenhofer, 
2012). Therefore, it seems crucial to consider the concept more as one element for 
benchmarking, rather than a holistic and complete evaluation technique. First and foremost, 
the LCoE of one generation technology may vary significantly within different geographies 
and time periods, or may depend on the actual installed capacity of a power plant and its 
certain construction and operation technology. In fact, even within one country, the numbers 
may differ remarkably. Market and technology risks may influence the price of fuel or labor, 
and geographical differences or seasonal changes can directly impact on the capacity factor f 
(Narbel, Hansen, & Lien, 2013).  
Figure 18: Minimum-, Average- and Maximum LCoE in the US based on Data  from the E.I.A (U.S 
Energy Information Administration, 2014)  illustrates the wide spectrum of LCoEs per electricity 
generation technology within the United States of America, showing the minimum LCoE, the 
average value and the maximum (U.S Energy Information Administration, 2014). 
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Figure 18: Minimum-, Average- and Maximum LCoE in the US based on Data  from the E.I.A
33
 (U.S 
Energy Information Administration, 2014) 
Furthermore, the LCoE metric does not contain parameters accounting for some important 
physical constraints of electricity generation and transmission, such as dispatchability or 
intermittency, nor does it include costs regarding the integration of power plants to the grid, 
in particular on a system level. As a consequence, the overall LCoE may draw a favorable 
picture for some technologies. Paul L. Joskow (2011) from the MIT Centre for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) argues that especially the LCoE comparison of 
intermittent and dispatchable electricity sources may lead to a biased metric regarding 
economic competitiveness. The author argues that this metric “is flawed because it 
effectively treats all electricity generated as a homogeneous product governed by the law of 
one price” (Joskow, 2011, S. 239). In fact, electricity demand and supply are often very 
volatile and electricity prices often vary significantly from hour to hour and season to season. 
The output profile of dispatchable conventional sources and variable renewable plants differs 
by nature. While dispatchable sources’ output is projectable, variable generating technologies’ 
                                                          
33
 The data is based on the minimum, average and maximum LCOE numbers in the United States of America 
for the year 2012 and converted from USD to EUR at a rate of: 1USD=0,8789EUR (07.05.2105). 
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output is often difficult to foresee. Joskow (2011) argues that variable renewable plants are 
extremely sensitive to their location and weather conditions, i.e. the output profile of a solar 
power plant will highly correlate with the sun-hours and a wind-power plant will only 
generate electricity under the right wind conditions. Therefore, the output profiles of 
dispatchable sources and variable sources, and in consequence also their associated market 
value at the wholesale market, are difficult to compare. Thus, even-though a variable 
electricity source and a dispatchable electricity source may have a similar LCoE, their net 
economic value and profitability can vary significantly (Joskow, 2011). In consequence, 
Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer and Edenhofer (2012) of the Potsdam-Institute for Climate Impact 
research, state that the competitiveness of variably generating power plants’ is only given 
when their market value, representing the marginal economic value
34
, is equal or higher than 
their LCoE value. Further, the authors argue, these constraints of the LCoE analysis increase 
with the growing relative share of variable power plants in the electricity mix. In order to 
account for an increase of integration cost, they propose the concept of a so-called System-
LCoE (sLCoE). According to Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer, & Edenhofer (2012), this concept 
allows benchmarking of different technologies not only by their generation costs, but also 
includes the indirect cost of integrating power plants to the grid system. The following 
models are largely based on the work of Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer and Edenhofer (2012) 
𝑠𝐿𝐶𝑜𝐸 = 𝐿𝐶𝑜𝐸 +  ∆ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Where:   ∆ =  
𝑑
𝑑𝐸𝑣
∗ 𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡. 
Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer and Edenhofer argue that the marginal integration cost ∆ can be 
seen as the increase of overall system integration costs 𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡. when variable electricity 
generation sources are marginally added 𝐸𝑣. As a result, the authors recommend, even though 
they acknowledge that there is no broadly accepted quantitive framework to measure 
integration cost, to include all such costs, which are indirect and linked to grid augmentation, 
storage and back-up facilities, balancing and even the requirements for higher flexibility of 
non-intermittent sources. (Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer, & Edenhofer, 2012, pp. 3-11). 
                                                          
34
 Assuming efficient and perfect market conditions. 
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Figure 19: LCoE, System LCoE and the Drivers of Integration Costs; Graph Based on Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer, & 
Edenhofer (2012) 
Figure 19 shows that integration cost can be subdivided into three parts: profile cost, 
balancing cost and grid cost. According to Lion Hirth (2012), these three components arise 
from three properties of electricity generation, namely: variability, uncertainty and location 
specificity. Whereas grid related costs may occur for any kind of power plants, profile costs 
and balancing costs are increasingly and particularly an issue when integrating variable 
renewable power plants, such as wind- and solar PV plants. However, it is important to note, 
that variability is not an exclusive occurrence of variable renewable electricity generation. In 
fact, even in a power system with solely conventional dispatchable sources, fluctuations in 
demand and supply would have to be managed (I.E.A - International Energy Agency, 2011). 
Profile costs are caused by the issue of variability - thus, integrating a higher share of variable 
renewable sources requires additional back-up infrastructure and potentially infrastructure for 
overload management. Furthermore, a higher share of variable sources may result in higher 
flexibility requirements for dispatchable power plants, and therefore decrease their full load 
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hours due to longer ramp-up/down periods (Hirth, 2012; Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer, & 
Edenhofer, 2012). 
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑢𝑝 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑.  𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠35 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, requires balancing services to react quickly to unforeseen 
intra-day changes of supply. Advanced forecasting tools, modern market design and limited 
use of curtailment measures can help to reduce such costs. However, since wind, sun-hours or 
tidal conditions are not perfectly predictable, intra-day balancing due to uncertain resource 
supply will remain an economic disadvantage of variable renewable electricity generation. 
According to Narbel, Hansen and Lien (2013), such costs may account for 0,7 Eurocent/kWh 
up to 4,7 Eurocent/kWh
36
. Figure 20, for example, shows a comparison of Germany with 
Europe  (EWIS) and I.E.A member countries. 
 
Figure 20: I.E.A Estimations for Wind Balancing Costs 2009; (Retrieved from I.E.A - International Energy Agency (2011, p. 
85); I.E.A - International Energy Agency, 2009). 
The third cost component of the integration costs is grid-connected expenses. These occur 
whenever a power plant is integrated into the grid and include transmission investments, and 
supporting infrastructure, e.g. for congestion services or increase of dispatchable power 
                                                          
35
 Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer and Edenhofer added the flexibility effect as a fourth cost component to the profile 
costs. For further information, please see (Nicolosi, 2012) 
36
 2008 Euro – 1$/MWh-7$/MWh 
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plants due to balancing requirements. Transmission investments usually represent the largest 
bulk of grid related costs and, as mentioned before, incur whenever power plant is connected 
to the grid. These costs depend on the location and the distance to the grid; therefore they can 
vary significantly from case to case. Furthermore, there may be additional grid expenses, 
when the grid design has to be changed or additional international transmission investments, 
import and export have to be undertaken to secure, due to the additionally integrated power 
plants (U.S Energy Information Administration, 2014). However, the focus in this section 
will be on the more direct nature of transmission cost, those investments required to directly 
connect the power plant to the grid. Figure 21: Transmission Cost in EUR  in the US per 
Technology (U.S Energy Information Administration, 2014) shows the different average for 
transmission cost within the United States
37
 (U.S Energy Information Administration, 2014). 
The green columns represent the estimates for variable renewable sources, the blue columns 
dispatchable technology and hydroelectric generation is considered to be partly dispatchable 
(U.S Energy Information Administration, 2014). 
 
Figure 21: Transmission Cost in EUR  in the US per Technology (U.S Energy Information Administration, 2014) 
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 The authors consider the US average an appropriate benchmark, due to the diverse geographical and climatice 
circumstances within the county 
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In conclusion, the graph below summarizes the different drivers of the System LCoE: 
 
This shows that, on the one hand, including integration costs into the LCoE metric may be 
very complicated due to the indirect nature of its components but on the other, it enables a 
deeper and more unbiased comparison of different technologies. This approach could become 
more and more important for Germany’s energy transition, because a transparent evaluation 
of energy sources is essential to secure the economic- and environmental feasibility and to 
maintain a high level of security of supply (Ueckerdt, Hirth, Luderer, & Edenhofer, 2012). 
 𝑠𝐿𝐶𝑜𝐸 = 𝐿𝐶𝑜𝐸 +  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐿𝑅 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
  
Figure 22: Example of the System LCoE for Wind in Europe (Retrieved from Ueckerdt, 
Hirth, Luderer, & Edenhofer (2012, p. 15)) 
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4.3.3. EROI 
Much like the System LCOE, the EROI (The Energy Returned on Invested) is a parameter to 
assess and compare different energy supply techniques and is defined thus by Weißbach et al. 
(p.212, 2013): The EROI of a power plant (R) refers to the ratio of the usable energy (ER) the 
plant returns during its lifetime to all the invested energy (EI) needed to make the energy 
useful (Weißbach, et al., 2013).  
Therefore:  
𝑅 =
ER
EI
 
It thus follows that to break even, the EROI should be 1; however, for a plant to be useful, it 
needs a surplus that can be utilized for such purposes (Morgan, 2014). Weißbach et al. (2013) 
posit that this minimum viable EROI for countries such as The United States of America and 
Germany is 7; building upon this, Morgan (2014) contends that an energy source with an 
EROEI lower than this threshold value will not be able to sustain the energy needs of such 
complex societies.  
 
Figure 23: Energy Returned on Energy Invested with (buffered) and without (unbuffered) energy storage (Retrieved from 
Weißbach et al. (2013), p. 28) 
79 
 
 
Based on the findings in Weißbach et al. (2013) which account for different parameters such 
as construction, commissioning, production, maintenance, and decommisiong, illustrated in 
Figure 23 above, Morgan (2014) argues that nuclear (Pressurized Water Reactor), hydro 
(med.-size), coal, closed cycle gas turbines (CCGT), concentrating solar power (CSP) and 
wind have energy surpluses sufficient to support a developed industrial society based on their 
unbuffered EROI values (above the threshold value of 7). However, if storage is factored in, 
further investment is required, resulting in lower buffered EROI values. Weißbach et al. 
(2013) assumed hydroelectric energy storage to calculate the EROI; however, should a more 
energy intensive form of storage be required, the buffered EROI value is likely to drop 
further (Morgan, 2014). These results become salient when evaluating the incorporation of 
more renewable sources, which would need storage to be viable, to transition towards a low 
carbon system, which Germany is currently aspiring to accomplish within the premise of its 
Energiewende.  Morgan (2014) identifies this as a catch-22 situation wherein overcoming 
intermittency of renewables by adding additional storage will reduce the net EROI below the 
threshold level required to sustain societal needs.  
As can be seen however, discussion focused on the EROI is fairly recent. However, it 
provides an opportunity to assess the Energiewende from an energy based accounting, in 
addition to the economic based accounting inherent to the LCOE.  
4.3.4. Electricity prices in European and international Comparison 
In order to examine the development of electricity prices it is important to break the overall 
electricity price down into its different elements. Table 3 below shows the price breakdown 
for domestic users from year 2007 to 2014 and subdivides the overall price into the distinct 
components of Energy and Supply, Network Costs and Taxes and Levies, which includes the 
EEG surcharges. This distinction is crucial to examine the price development over time and 
to see which price components actually increased and which ones stagnated or even 
decreased over time.  Furthermore, this table shows both: the percentage difference from 
2011 (the initial year of Germany’s nuclear shutdown) to 2014; and the change from 2007 to 
2014 (European Commission- Eurostat, 2015).  
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Table 3: Price Breakdown for Domestic Users from 2007-2014 (Source: European Commission- Eurostat, 2015)  
 
Germany’s electricity prices for domestic users are the second highest within the European 
Union (and the European continent). Only Denmark reported higher electricity prices for 
households. This is in fact not a new scenario; Germany already ranked second in this 
category semester 2 of 2011. However, whereas Denmark’s electricity price for households 
stayed relatively stable from 2011 to 2014, Germany’s domestic customers had to accept a 
price increase of overall 17,5% from 2011 (Figures 24 and 25)
38
.  
                                                          
38
 DA: 2 500 kWh to 5 000 kwh 
Breakdown: domestic 
user consumption 
class  Price-breakdown 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Δ 2011-
2014 
 Δ 2007-
2014 
Less than 1000 kWh 
Energy & Supply 0,1067 0,1319 0,1291 0,1385 0,1305 0,1409 0,1389 0,1424 9,1% 33,5% 
Network costs 0,1246 0,1089 0,1122 0,1143 0,1159 0,1137 0,1214 0,1152 -0,6% -7,5% 
Taxes & levies 0,1034 0,1072 0,1154 0,1197 0,1367 0,1482 0,1664 0,1760 28,7% 70,2% 
TOTAL 0,3347 0,3480 0,3567 0,3725 0,3831 0,4028 0,4267 0,4336 13,2% 29,5% 
1000 to 2500 kWh 
Energy & Supply 0,0747 0,0903 0,0904 0,0993 0,0908 0,0958 0,0976 0,0920 1,3% 23,2% 
Network costs 0,0727 0,0635 0,0658 0,0670 0,0689 0,0684 0,0728 0,0727 5,5% 0,0% 
Taxes & levies 0,0826 0,0854 0,0934 0,0991 0,1136 0,1244 0,1432 0,1534 35,0% 85,7% 
TOTAL 0,2300 0,2392 0,2496 0,2654 0,2733 0,2886 0,3136 0,3181 16,4% 38,3% 
2 500 to 5 000 kWh 
Energy & Supply 0,0661 0,0801 0,0798 0,0877 0,0807 0,0845 0,0866 0,0772 -4,3% 16,8% 
Network costs 0,0618 0,0540 0,0561 0,0570 0,0588 0,0587 0,0623 0,0668 13,6% 8,1% 
Taxes & levies 0,0826 0,0854 0,0934 0,0991 0,1136 0,1244 0,1432 0,1534 35,0% 85,7% 
TOTAL 0,2105 0,2195 0,2293 0,2438 0,2531 0,2676 0,2921 0,2974 17,5% 41,3% 
5 000 to 15 000 kWh 
Energy & Supply 0,0629 0,0724 0,0730 0,0815 0,0791 0,0783 0,0801 0,0744 -5,9% 18,3% 
Network costs 0,0558 0,0483 0,0502 0,0509 0,0530 0,0528 0,0560 0,0573 8,1% 2,7% 
Taxes & levies 0,0805 0,0832 0,0906 0,0968 0,1102 0,1231 0,1415 0,1510 37,0% 87,6% 
TOTAL 0,1992 0,2039 0,2138 0,2292 0,2423 0,2542 0,2776 0,2827 16,7% 41,9% 
More than 15 000 kWh 
Energy & Supply 0,0594 0,0690 0,0664 0,0727 0,0713 0,0732 0,0744 0,0710 -0,4% 19,5% 
Network costs 0,0526 0,0448 0,0451 0,0466 0,0487 0,0490 0,0520 0,0512 5,1% -2,7% 
Taxes & levies 0,0761 0,0789 0,0868 0,0955 0,1071 0,1173 0,1355 0,1439 34,4% 89,1% 
TOTAL 0,1881 0,1927 0,1983 0,2148 0,2271 0,2395 0,2619 0,2661 17,2% 41,5% 
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Figure 24: Price Development from S2 2011 to S2 2014 in % (European Commission- Eurostat, 2015) 
Figure 25: Comparison of Domestic User Prices in the EU – 2 500-5 000 kWh Semester 2 of year 2011 and Semester 2 of 2014 
(European Commission- Eurostat, 2015) 
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One interesting trend here to observe is that costs for energy and supply (-5,9% to +9,1% 
depending on the customer class) and network costs (-0,6% to +13,6% depending on the 
customer class) changed moderately from 2011 to 2014 (I.E.A - International Energy Agency, 
2013), yet taxes and levies increased drastically in the meantime, by minimum 28,8% to 37% 
for the DA 5 000-15 000 kWh (European Commission- Eurostat, 2015; I.E.A - International 
Energy Agency, 2013). This is illustrated in Figure 26 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.5. EEG 
The German Renewable Energy Act (EEG) and its precursor, the Feed-in Law, have been 
instrumental in deploying renewable energy-sourced electricity (RES-E) in Germany. 
However, with an increasing share of renewables in Germany’s power supply, the EEG must 
be poised for stronger system and market integration. Firstly, RESE-generation should be 
adapted to demand; currently, operators receive the same price for any RES-E generated, 
irrespective of whether it is peak or off-peak demand. Secondly, costs to customers must be 
as low as possible while simultaneously not threatening the growth of renewables necessary 
to confront climate change (Langniß, Diekmann, & Lehr, 2009).  
The EEG was established in 2000 and has since been amended with its most recent 
amendment coming into force in August 2014. The EEG is a feed-in tariff system which 
mandates distribution network operators (DNOs) to connect RES-driven power plants, 
purchase RES-E, and pay a fixed remuneration (cent per kWh) to the plant operator; the 
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Figure 26: Price Development for Domestic Users - 2 500-5 000 kWh (European Commission- Eurostat, 2015) 
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remuneration is cost orientated and differentiated by technology and plant attributes among 
other characteristics (Langniß, Diekmann, & Lehr, 2009). The remuneration is fixed for 20 
years for most technologies, allowing investors a modicum of security in planning and 
salvaging relevant costs. However, it decreases for new power plants every year (in 
accordance with a vintage approach) by a technology-specific degression rate reflective of 
technological developments and cost reductions associated with learning effects. Given that 
the degression rate is determined in advance, it directs plant manufacturers to expected cost 
reductions. Langniß et al. (2009) thus propose that the remuneration can be modeled thus:  
𝑝𝑡𝑣𝑖 = 𝑝𝑇𝑖(1 − 𝑑𝑖)
𝑣−𝑇 + 𝑘𝑖   
p: Specific remuneration per kWh 
t: Actual year of remuneration 
v: Start of operation (vintage) 
i: Technology category 
k: Additional premiums for innovative technologies 
d: Degression rate 
       
Simplistically, by prioritizing access for renewable power to the grid, the EEG allows an 
operator of a RES power plant to deliver electricity to the DNO who in turn passes it on to 
the Transmission System Operator (TSO) who then passes it on to retailers. However, the 
commercial transfer of RES-E from the power generator to the consumer, as well as the 
payment from the consumer to the power plant is complicated as a result of two key 
challenges (Langniß, Diekmann, & Lehr, 2009). 
 
i. Given that intermittent sources such as wind and solar comprise half the 
power within the premise of the EEG, supply needs to match demand and 
appropriate mechanisms need to be instituted to allow for cost recovery in 
this service.  
ii. The German transmission grid is divided into four regions with each one 
run by a different operator. This necessitates a balancing mechanism 
between TSOs to guarantee equal distribution of both, amount of RES-E 
remunerated annually and simultaneous burdens, based on the electricity 
consumption in all four transmission grids. 
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As seen in Figure 26, however, the share of costs attributable to taxes and levies in the total 
price paid by domestic consumers has increased drastically. This has, in large part, been a 
result of the EEG Surcharge, paid by German electricity consumers to support investments in 
renewable energy production.  According to the BMWi (2014), anyone generating electricity 
from solar, wind, hydro or biomass is paid a fixed price per kilowatt-hour (guaranteed for 20 
years)—this electricity is then purchased by grid operators who subsequently sell it on the 
power exchange. The difference between the fixed price and the generally lower market price 
is distributed over electricity consumers and is known as the EEG surcharge (BMWi, 2015). 
 
Figure 27: EEG surcharge in cent per kilowatt hour (Retrieved from: http://www.bmwi.de/EN/Topics/Energy/Renewable-
Energy/2014-renewable-energy-sources-act,did=677210.html) 
As seen in Figure 27 above, the EEG surcharge has increased progressively since 2000 
necessitating stabilization of the costs of expanding the use of renewables such as biomass, 
PV, and wind. A study commissioned by Agora Energiewende and conducted by the Oeko-
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Institut advances the notion that the surcharge paid by electricity consumers can be lowered if 
the exemption of industries within the purview of the EEG is limited to energy- and export-
intensive industries (Oeko-Institut e.V., 2014). The report contends that large industrial 
consumers should also contribute to the costs of the Energiewende; these commercial 
consumers, prosumers, and rail operators have hitherto been exempt from the charge. In line 
with these findings, the amendment of the EEG in 2014 also sought to distribute the costs of 
finding renewables more equitably. The Special Equalization Scheme for electricity-intensive 
industries, which mandates exemptions and reduced EEG surcharges for electricity-intensive 
industries, was revised and made compliant with EU legislation; in the future, this exemption 
will be applicable to only electricity-intensive industries that compete internationally. 
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4.4. Environmental Sustainability 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany straddles a precarious balance; it has embarked upon an 
ambitious climate and energy policy by transitioning away from the use of fossil fuels and 
phasing out nuclear energy. Like many of its other European counterparts, Germany seeks to 
accomplish a low-carbon system; however, in seeking to phase out nuclear energy by 2022, 
Germany will also be phasing out approximately half of its current source of carbon free 
electricity calling for a greater dependence on renewable sources of energy (Buchan, 2012, p. 
2). Accomplishing the goals of this energy concept while simultaneously maintaining its 
position as a leading industrialized country thus poses an inevitable challenge for the country.  
This section of the thesis thus provides a background of Germany’s current Energy Concept 
which guides its climate and energy policy.  
4.4.1. The Energy Concept 2010 
On September 28, 2010, Germany adopted an Energy Concept which according to The 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety 
(BMU) stipulated how Germany could best accomplish “an environmentally sound, reliable 
and affordable energy supply and for the first time mapped a road into the age of renewable 
energies.” (BMU, 2010) These goals, while ambitious nonetheless form the central tenets of 
Germany’s long term energy policy. The key goals of the German Energy Concept of 2010 
can be summarized in Table 4 below.   
Table 4: The German Energy Concept, 2010 (Adapted from BMU (2011)) 
 Goal by 2020 Goal by 2050 
Reduction in green house gas 
emissions 
40 % 
 (Relative to 1990 
levels) 
80 to 95% 
(Relative to 1990 levels) 
Decrease in primary energy 
consumption 
20% 50% 
Energy productivity Rise by 2.1% per year compared to final energy 
consumption 
Electricity consumption Fall by 10%  
(Relative to 2008 levels) 
Fall by 25% 
(Relative to 2008 levels) 
Share of renewable energies in gross 
final energy consumption 
18% 60% 
Share of renewable in gross 
electricity consumption 
35% 80% 
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Of particular significance is the long term positioning of the German Energy Concept which 
goes beyond the European Union’s targets for 2020. However, to accomplish this transition 
in an economically efficient way, the BMU proposed the extension of the operating lives of 
nuclear power plant by an average of 12 years to bridge the transition from the status quo to 
the goals it envisioned in its Energy Concept. 
4.4.2. The Energy Package 2011 
After the nuclear disaster in Fukushima (Japan), Germany adopted measures in the summer 
of 2011 to gradually phase out nuclear power by 2022. Given the hitherto importance of 
nuclear power as a bridge power towards a more sustainable energy policy, the lack thereof 
necessitated higher energy efficiency and an accelerated transition to renewable sources of 
energy. Accordingly, in June and July 2011, the German government incorporated the 
following policies into its Energy Concept to ‘supplement and accelerate implementation of 
the measures set out in the Energy Concept of September 2010’ (BMU, 2011) 
4.4.3. Greenhouse gas emissions 
Germany has set itself very ambitious targets regarding decarbonization. In fact, Germany 
plans to decrease its emissions by eighty to ninety percent in 2050 in comparison to the 1990 
benchmark According to the German Institute for Economic Research (2015, p. 7), Germany 
represented the largest CO2 emitting economy in the European Union in 2013, with an overall 
estimated CO2 equivalent emission of 954,7 million tons. Even-though this number shows an 
overall decrease of already 23,5% from 1990, the short-term assessment shows a small 
increase from 2011 (952,4 million tons) to 2013 (Eurostat, 2015). 
A recent report from the IAEA (2013, p. 12) compared the GHG emissions of different types 
of electricity generation source, both conventional generation technologies and renewables. 
The result indicated that even with CCS technology, fossil fuel plants remain high in GHG 
emissions, approximately 200g CO2-eq.per kWh for coal and 150g CO2.per kWh for natural 
gas. On the other hand, the renewables have demonstrated lower values regarding GHG 
emission, as the highest source, geothermal, has emissions being around 130g CO2-eq.per 
kWh and the lowest one being run of river hydro nuclear with less than 10g CO2-eq.per kWh. 
Nuclear energy generation was accounted with 14.9g CO2-eq.per kWh (IAEA - International 
Atomic Energy Agency, 2013). Germany’s energy mix, particularly such sources providing 
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base load supply, will have to shift towards cleaner technologies in order to achieve the long-
run goal of a 85 to 90 % reduction in 2050. 
Furthermore, it is important to state, that the emission of pollutants is not limited to CO2. 
According to the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), greenhouse gases, in combination 
with heavy metals emitted by fossil fuel power plants, result in more than 18.000 deaths per 
year and lead to large number of chronic bronchitis cases within the European Union 
(European Environmental Bureau). The EEB further estimates the overall economic health 
cost to up to 43 billion Euros. In fact, these numbers are estimated to be significantly and 
over-proportionally higher for other parts of the world. Furthermore, according to the OECD 
(N.E.A - Nuclear Energy Agency/OECD, 2010, p. 35), no other energy chains cause more 
fatalities (in absolute numbers and per GW installed) than coal and oil. 
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4.5. Acceptance 
4.5.1. The German Anti-Nuclear Movement 
In the period from the mid-1950s to the end of the 1990s, Germany viewed the use of nuclear 
energy as a cost-effective and reliable supply of energy, legally enshrined in the German 
Energy Act enacted on the 23
rd
 of December, 1959 (Blackmore, 2013). Strunz (2013) states 
that the conventional fossil-nuclear regime exhibited the following technological, political, 
and economic characteristics:  
i) Technological: Energy was primarily generated from nuclear power and fossil 
fuels in a centralized production structure and thereafter transmitted to consumers  
ii) Political: Subsidization and support from the state across the value chain 
iii) Economic: The major part of the German energy market was distributed among 
four big utilities; each of the ‘big four’ disposed of its own transmission network 
and competition was stymied as a result of regional separation of networks 
Public rhetoric at this time focused on security of supply and affordability and this, combined 
with the positive feedback from the mutually reinforced technological, political and economic 
pillars of the regime made it very resilient for subsequent decades (Strunz, 2013). As 
discussed in the previous chapter as well, nuclear energy provided a reliable clean source for 
base load in addition to being viable when assessed through both EROI and System LCOE 
metrics. 
Despite Governmental investment in nuclear development and building of reactors, 
demonstrations, protests and lobbying against it nonetheless existed (Blackmore, 2013). This 
opposition in the 1950s and 1960s was characterized by skepticism, even before they had 
learnt about the dangers of nuclear power (Uekoetter, 2012). This initial skepticism 
precipitated into a larger movement in the 1970s, culminating in mass demonstrations against 
different nuclear projects in subsequent decades.  
Blackmore (2013) employs a social constructivist lens and posits that it was a combination of 
the Fukushima accident as well as a relevant political context that precipitated in Germany’s 
decision to abandon nuclear power. The move to shut down Germany’s older nuclear plants 
and phase out the remaining ones by 2022 was in stark contrast to the initially proposed 
extension of the lifespan of its nuclear reactors in 2010.  
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Anti-nuclear Norms 
Blackmore (2013) considers anti-nuclear norms to be a “core reason” for Germany’s policy 
change. Drawing upon social constructivist literature, he contends that the German reaction to 
Fukushima was a combination of first, its anti-nuclear norms driven identity shaped by the 
country’s historical trajectory. Additionally, he also posits that anti-nuclear norms in isolation 
did not contribute to the Merkel’s change in nuclear policy; instead, the prevalent political 
climate at the time resulted in a populist move by the federal government.  This is also in line 
with Linehan’s assertion that both, framing of the issue and the political opportunity inherent 
to the situation precipitated the decision for the nuclear shutdown (Linehan, 2013).  
Employing a longitudinal analysis, Blackmore (2013) argues that it is vital to discern the 
cultural and institutional context of nuclear power prior to the German change in nuclear 
policy. Only analyzing Germany’s decision to abandon nuclear power and thus equating it to 
an anti-nuclear identity will not suffice. 
Blackmore (2013) identifies members of the German anti-nuclear movement as norm 
entrepreneurs who succeeded in creating resonant frames which consequently mobilized 
opposition to nuclear power. These frames thus evolved into norms, thereafter 
institutionalized in government policy. In a similar vein, the norm entrepreneurs who started 
the anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s could also be seen as what Kitschelt (1986) identifies 
as collective and rational decision makers who both mobilized their followers and promoted 
their causes with the best available strategies. Blackmore (2013) exemplifies this by alluding 
to the first major anti-nuclear event to receive extensive attention in Wyhl on the 18
th
 of 
February, 1975. Pursuant to this initial opposition, the norm entrepreneurs of the anti-nuclear 
movement succeeded in spreading the movement and in doing so, established resonant 
frames from the mid-1970s onwards (Blackmore, 2013). This anti-nuclear movement that 
thus evolved was characterized by its own expertise and understanding of the dangers nuclear 
power entailed (Uekoetter, 2012).   
This ‘risk’ frame was further exacerbated by the Three Mile Accident in Pennsylvania, USA 
on the 28
th
 of March, 1979—lending more credence to the anti-nuclear movement and in 
showing that an accident actually occurred, made the risk more credible.  This ‘empirical 
credibility’ that the Three Mile Accident imparted to the movement bolstered it further and 
allowed the risk frame to resonate with German nationals, evident in the protest in Hanover 
91 
 
 
after the accident on the 31
st
 of March, 1979 which was then the biggest anti-nuclear 
demonstration in Germany (Blackmore, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the crescendo of the anti-nuclear movement’s resonance was after the 
Chernobyl disaster on the 26
th
 of April, 1986. Similar to Three Mile, Chernobyl illustrated the 
impact of nuclear risks on citizens and consequently, amplified the nuclear risk frame 
(Blackmore, 2013). Bedford and Snow (in Blackmore 2013) also argue that Chernobyl 
impacted the German anti-nuclear movement as a result of its experiential 
commensurability—the extent to which the frame can benefit by relating to the quotidian 
experiences of the targets it encompasses.  In the aftermath of the accident, the German 
government took measures to protect citizens from radiation contamination from Chernobyl 
including, for example, closure of kindergartens and schools (Blackmore, 2013). By thus 
showing the direct effect of the accident on the day to day lives of German nationals, 
Chernobyl magnified the resonance of the anti-nuclear risk frame.  Resultantly, the number of 
protests increased with a concomitant majority of Germans mobilized against German power 
(Rüdig in Blackmore, 2013).  
Thus, the anti-nuclear movement, bolstered by Three Mile and Chernobyl, strengthened the 
anti-nuclear frames and made it resonate with broader public ideas of society—this allowed 
for new ways of discerning issues, and consequently functioned as norms. 
This risk frame was also instrumental in the phase of institutionalization of anti-nuclear 
norms. After 1990, the anti-nuclear movement focused on the issue of nuclear waste. In May 
1998, the German Environment Ministry announced that nuclear transports had been leaking 
radiation which exceeded allowed limits—consequently, nuclear transport was banned and 
the fact that the Government had been aware of this for the last decade damaged the 
reputation of the then ruling CDU/CSU-FDP coalition (Blackmore, 2013). Even though the 
radiation levels were not likely to cause harm, the possibility that nuclear radiation could 
directly affect German nationals added more credence to the anti-nuclear frame and amplified 
its resonance.  
Even when Merkel decided to reverse the SPD/Green coalition’s decision and instead 
extended the lifespan of reactors by 12 years on average by parliamentary majority, the 
norms still persisted. While successful in parliament, the change in policy was not supported 
by most Germans causing more protests. The phase-out by 2022 was ratified by 85% of 
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parliamentarians, passed by a majority of 513-79 in the lower house of the Bundestag (Davies, 
2011). Conversely, in a report from the European Commission, a non-negligible portion of 
citizens (24%) opposed the lifetime extension of existing nuclear plants (European 
Commission, 2010). For instance, in April 2010, nearly 120 000 people formed a 120 km 
long chain between the nuclear plants of Krümmel and Brunsbüttel making the strength of the 
German anti-nuclear norms evident (Blackmore, 2013).   
Political Climate 
Blackmore’s (2013) position that it was not just anti-nuclear norms that culminated in the 
wende regarding nuclear energy, finds resonance in Kitschelt’s idea of it being facilitated by 
a nation’s political opportunity structure (Kitschelt, 1986).  Kitschelt (1986) defines a 
political opportunity structure as: 
“Consisting of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and 
historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of 
protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others” (Kitschelt, 1986).  
Further, Kitschelt (1986) expounds on this role of political opportunity structures by 
identifying three possible means of influencing the capacity of social movements to engage in 
protests.  
Firstly, mobilization is contingent on the “coercive, normative, remunerative and 
informational resources” that a movement can deploy from its setting in its protest (Kitschelt, 
1986). He exemplifies this by identifying the vitality of non-violent resources in protests in 
Western democracies. This further underscores the importance of anti-nuclear norms — and 
the inherent opportunity to both collect and disseminate information and resources — in 
broad mobilization (Kitschelt, 1986).  As such, the political context is inextricably linked to 
the norms that it fosters or constrains.  In the German context, the original anti-nuclear 
movement transforming into one that framed nuclear power as a risk illustrates this role of 
this information dissemination. The risk of nuclear power could serve as a locus for these 
opposition movements to converge on.  
Secondly, the access of these movements to the public realm and consequently political 
decision making is in turn influenced by institutional rules, including electoral laws and rules 
concerning interaction between the government and interest groups (Kitschelt, 1986). On one 
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hand, these rules shape the demands of social movements that are hitherto not accepted 
political actors and on the other, could catalyze the institutionalization of new groups and 
claims. During the inception of the Anti-Nuclear movement, it had little access to the political 
system to demand policy changes. Consequently, the Government maintained a pro-nuclear 
position through the 1970s and early 1980s; however, this only provoked demonstrations and 
protests by the anti-nuclear movement (Blackmore, 2013). Notwithstanding this limited 
access to the political structure, attempts to demand nuclear policy change subsisted in the 
Bundestag—for example, after successful state elections, the Greens were voted into the 
Bundestag in March 1983. The Greens who were, in part, a consequence of the anti-nuclear 
movement persisted to bolster the anti-nuclear cause. In fact, the anti-nuclear activists of the 
1970s who vehemently opposed nuclear in Germany were the precursors to the Green Party 
(Davies, 2011). By securing access to the political structure, the anti-nuclear views were now 
represented by a political entity which increased both its credibility and its political 
opportunities (Blackmore, 2013).  
This was further institutionalized when the elections of September 1998 brought a coalition 
led by the SPD and the Greens to power. In 2000, the SPD-Greens coalition concluded an 
agreement to phase-out nuclear power which Blackmore (2013) attributes to the risk frame. 
He argues that the anti-nuclear norms that characterized German identity at that point 
influenced the Government’s behavior to a certain extent.  
Finally, the appearance or disappearance of other social movements could alter the 
opportunities which a social movement encounters to mobilize protest (Kitschelt, 1986). The 
political climate is underscored by Strunz (2013) wherein political changes in 2011 caused 
the transition from a fossil-nuclear regime to one based on renewables (Strunz, 2013).  
Following Kitschelt’s (1986) line of argument, this could be seen as the appearance of a pro 
renewable social movement. The political context, both domestic and within the EU, fostered 
the emergence of a renewables-based regime and positioned it as a viable political, 
technological, and social alternative. The resilience of the fossil-nuclear regime was 
weakened by an alternative in an RES based regime, which caused a spillover of political 
changes in the economic and technical pillars (Strunz, 2013). Pursuant to the emergent 
significance of the environmental movement in German politics, RES-support policies were 
started in 1991 and thereafter extended in 2000. This bolstered technical developments and 
greater decentralized production; resultantly, the share of energy generated by renewables 
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increased from 4 to 23% in the period between 1996 and 2012 (Strunz, 2013).  Unlike 
conventional sources of energy, he inherent decentralized and small scale energy production 
from renewables threatened the big four oligopoly. This was exacerbated by the liberalization 
of the EU electricity market—and the consequent empowerment of consumers and separation 
of the hitherto bundled production and transmission. As such, Strunz (2013) contends that 
growing competition in the energy market and the weakened positive feedback for large-scale 
energy production made the fossil-nuclear regime less resilient.  
Until 2011, however, proponents of the nuclear regime succeeded in preventing a regime 
shift on the grounds that doing so would threaten security of supply; the big four and their 
political allies thus continued to view nuclear an essential bridging technology (Strunz, 2013). 
This resilience was exemplified in the Chancellor Merkel led Conservative Government’s 
decision to reverse the earlier phase out nuclear power by the coalition of the Social 
Democrats and the Green Party (Strunz, 2013). 
The reversal of this decision after Fukushima was also motivated politically, as argued by 
Blackmore (2013) given impending elections in Germany at the time. For instance, there 
were several core regional elections in March 2011 including the CDU stronghold of Baden-
Würtenburg which faced stiff competition from the SPD and the Greens. The premier of 
Baden- Würtenburg, Stefan Mappus from the CU had supported Merkel’s decision to 
postpone the closure of nuclear power plants. Baden- Würtenburg also owned a 45% stake in 
Energie Baden- Würtenburg which operated four reactors in the region and assured a safety 
assessment of the reactors after Fukushima (Linehan, 2013). The pre-election polls placed 
Mappu’s coalition at par with the SPD-Greens, making the competition close (Linehan, 2013). 
Blackmore (2013) thus argues that the national response to Fukushima would directly impact 
the regional candidates of the ruling coalition, and could thus have affected Merkel’s decision 
for the nuclear shutdown.  In fact, 71% of the German population was of the opinion that the 
decision was a tactical positioning in light of the impending state elections (Umfrage: Wähler 
strafen Union für Atomkurs ab, 2011). 
Fukushima 
Even before Fukushima, 53% of Germans were of the opinion that nuclear risks were being 
underestimated and recorded a 60% risk perception (European Commission, 2010). At the 
same time however, 51% of Germans were of the opinion that nuclear power plants can be 
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operated in a safe manner; this figure was however, below the EU average of 59% (European 
Commission, 2010). Contrarily, 70% of Germans recorded high levels of disbelief in the safe 
management of radioactive waste (European Commission, 2010).  
The Fukushima Daiichi accident highlighted the anti-nuclear movement’s position regarding 
risks of nuclear energy and allowed a chance for it to strengthen its message. This was 
emphasized in several protests following the earthquake. On the 12
th
 of March, ca. 60.000 
people formed a 45 km long human chain between Stuttgart and the Necarwestheim nuclear 
plant. This was followed by protests at the national level by nearly 110 000 people on the 14
th
 
of March. Fukushima thus, much like Three Mile and Chernobyl, increased the resonance of 
the anti-nuclear movement’s risk frame and imparted more empirical credibility by showing 
that the risk of nuclear power could be real (Blackmore, 2013).  
At the same time however, Blackmore (2013) argues that the accident held little relevance to 
Germany, which was not as prone to natural disasters—accordingly, it could be contended 
that while Fukushima made the nuclear threat more credible, it did not bolster its relevance or 
salience for Germans. Wittneben (2012) however, argues that Germans feel a cultural 
proximity to Japan insofar as both countries had to reconstruct their infrastructure and 
identity post World War II and pride themselves with quality engineering and efficiency 
(Wittneben, 2012). As such, they believed that if an accident of that nature could occur in 
Japan, it could be a possibility for Germany as well though from a safety control lens, rather 
than one of Germany being susceptible to natural disasters.  
However, the German Nuclear Power industry is structured in a way to enforce checks and 
balances. As discussed in Chapter 4.3.4. Organization and Structure of the German Nuclear 
Power Industry, through both organizational and legal measures, Germany has safety as a key 
priority. For instance, the BMUB is supported by different commissions including the 
Reactor Safety Commission, Commission for Radiological Protection (SSK) and the Nuclear 
Waste Management Commission (ESK) to secure an independent and comprehensive 
overview of technical progress relevant to safety. Furthermore, the Nuclear Safety Standards 
Commission (KTA) stipulates exact standards for nuclear operations, in accordance with the 
BfS and by incorporating different stakeholders—operators, experts, manufacturers, federal- 
and state authorities, as well as representatives of public interest—ensures that no stakeholder 
group can be overruled.   In the case of nuclear, institutional factors that Schweizer et al. 
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(2014) believe could negatively affect public acceptance were robust and allowed for public 
opinions to be heard in addition to making safety a cornerstone of German nuclear policy. 
Linehan (2013) complement’s Kitschelt and states that Fukushima provided a political 
opportunity for anti-nuclear dissent to be vocalized and the German response was in turn 
dictated by the permeability of governing institutions (Linehan, 2013). She deconstructs how 
Germany’s electoral system provided for proportional representation, making it easier for 
newly formed groups to enter the system as was the case with the Greens; through their entry, 
the Greens were able to consolidate their position as a background player until Fukushima 
allowed them to gather sufficient attention and an electoral breakthrough in Baden-
Würtemberg. 
Drawing upon a resilience framework, Strunz (2013) views the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
as an exogenous disturbance that initiated the regime shift from nuclear to renewables. The 
decision for a nuclear phase out after Fukushima had severe implications for the fossil-
nuclear regime along all three axes—technological, political, and economic (Strunz, 2013).  
i) Technological: Firstly, the plummeting drop in nuclear power’s share necessitates 
substitution of the remaining share from other sources (Strunz, 2013). Feed-in 
from nuclear has higher stability than feed-in from RES; Strunz (2013) thus 
contends that the decision for the phaseout forced energy providers and 
transmission operators to adapt within a restricted time-frame and thus connotes a 
break up of technological path dependency.  
 
ii) Political: The decision to phase out nuclear also represented a triumph of 
opponents of nuclear power in Germany made particularly salient by the fact that 
the decision was made by a Conservative Government which was a proponent of 
nuclear power.  
 
iii) Economic: In Germany, the introduction of nuclear had been heavily subsidized. 
This allowed big utilities to reduce their up-front capital costs, but at the same 
time capitalize on the benefits of their soon to be depreciated plants. (Strunz, 
2013) However, the phase-out deprived the big four of their most profitable 
technology assets and consequently, also reduced their political leverage. 
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The acquiescence of the Federal Government to public opinion is also evidenced in findings 
by Richter et al. (2013) who find that the government decision to phase out nuclear resulted 
in an increase in reported levels of happiness – as a result of positive effects on general life 
satisfaction and reduced worries about the safety of nuclear power plants.  
4.5.2. From a Fossil Fuel-Nuclear to a Renewables Regime 
In addition to understanding the technical, legal, and economic nuances of the Energiewende, 
Zoellner et al. (2008) contend that wide public acceptance and a concomitant transfer of 
consciousness into quotidian life are vital to accomplishing Germany’s carbon reduction 
goals.  An Acceptance Study by RWE points to the fact that the major impediment to 
successfully fulfilling the Energy Transition will be societal and not technical in nature 
(RWE AG, 2012). Whereas Germany seems confident to realize the Energy Transition from a 
technical perspective, the real challenge will rest in the country’s ability to adopt a culture of 
dialogue and participation. The study also finds that there is a certain cognitive dissonance 
among the German population; Germans are, for the most part, in favor of the Energiewende 
and the support of citizens remains intact as illustrated in a survey conducted by the IG BCE 
(Industrigewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie) trade union (RWE AG, 2012). That said 
though, as outlined by Horst (2007), there is a difference between acceptance in principle and 
acceptance in practice. The Acceptance Study indicates that despite being in favor of the 
Energiewende, understanding regarding the actual relationships, requirements, and 
consequences remain limited in German society. 
The study further claims that contemporary Germans are more willing to take a critical stand 
on projects and voice their concerns openly, relative to previous generations; in this context, 
participation and co-determination become essential in the public agenda (RWE AG, 2012). 
This increased willingness to protest is accompanied by a concomitant lack of trust in the 
government and corporations. Regarding the government, most Germans are of the opinion 
that they do not have much influence on governmental action; in a survey conducted by a 
weekly magazine ‘Stern’, 79% of respondents responded in the negative when asked if they 
had a say in Germany and similarly, 94% of Germans were of the opinion that they 
themselves did not have much say in governmental action according to another survey by the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung foundation (cited in RWE AG, 2012). According to another survey 
by the Bertelsmann Stiftung foundation, a similarly negative opinion is found in German 
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opinions regarding large corporations which are perceived as guilty of lobbyism, greed and 
being “out of touch” (RWE AG, 2012).  
In results from data from a survey conducted by the Erhebung der Gesellschaft für 
Konsumforschung (GfK) in September 2014, the results regarding acceptance of the 
Energiewende were as follows (BDI, 2014). 
Table 5: Acceptance of the Energiewende (Adapted and translated by the Authors from BDI Energiewende Navigator 2014) 
Indicator Prompt % of sample who ‘Agree’ 
or ‘Somewhat Agree’ 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Relevance of the 
Energiewende for the 
population 
The Energiewende is central 
for the future development of 
Germany 
-  86,3 83,6 86,3 
Acceptance of the 
Energiewende in the 
population 
Aggregated value of the 
following four statements:  
i. I know the 
essential 
objectives of the 
Energiewende 
ii. I support the 
implementation of 
the Energiewende 
iii. The 
implementation of 
the Energiewende 
is currently on 
track 
iv. The costs of the 
Energiewende in 
Germany exceed 
the benefits 
-  55,3 55,0 54,6 
Acceptance of major 
projects in the population 
In order to implement the 
Energiewende, I am ready to 
take its negative impact on 
my environment into account 
-  50,0 47,8 45,3 
Acceptance of electricity 
price increases 
In order to implement the 
Energiewende, I am ready to 
purchase electricity at higher 
prices 
23,9 18,0 19,1 -  
 
The results of these studies indicate that the role of public acceptance in Germany is much 
nuanced. On one hand, the public is accepting of the overall project with a majority agreeing 
that it is relevant to the German population. At the same time, acceptance levels of both 
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major projects and electricity price increases vary with, the former having decreased and the 
latter having increased according to the aforementioned assessment by the BDI (2014). 
Furthermore, the studies also emphasize that public opinion in Germany is also focused on a 
lack of integration or awareness as indicated in studies by ‘Stern’ magazine and the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung foundation discussed earlier. To this end, it is essential to understand the 
nature of public opposition to infrastructure projects and the nature of civic participation.  
Much like Blackmore (2013) attributes the origins of the anti-nuclear movement to norm 
entrepreneurs, Strunz (2013) identifies the importance of institutional entrepreneurs, who 
advocated sustainability and support for renewables, in constructing a political and 
technological alternative to the fossil-nuclear regime. However, public acceptance is vital 
should the RES regime be expected to remain resilient.  
Strunz (2013) argues that without support from civil society, the energy transition could 
result in major public resistance since citizens would accrue the current costs of the transition 
with benefits reaped only by future generations. These costs include monetary as well as 
aesthetic and environmental costs. For instance, NIMBY-ism related to the expansion of 
transmission lines and RES facilities (for example, biogas) have been observed and public 
acceptability is contingent on the German public participating and benefiting from the 
transition (Strunz, 2013). In fact, when polled regarding energy issues (and the use of nuclear 
energy in particular), a majority of Germans (36%) preferred to be consulted and heard 
directly in the decision making process (European Commission, 2010).  
According to Zoellner et al. (2008) the economic consideration of the respective renewable 
energy system, discerned as a positive cost-benefit analysis by the individual, is the strongest 
predictor for reported acceptance (Zoellner, Schweizer-Ries, & Wemheuer, 2008)
39
. While it 
must be noted that representative perceptions cannot be drawn from the four case studies 
examined, the paper nonetheless emphasizes the role of social processes in determining 
future planning processes. In fact, a survey conducted by the Forsa Institute and published by 
WINGAS GmbH, costs and climate protection had the highest priority among German 
citizens (Forsa, 2014). 
                                                          
39
 The study presents the results from a survey which is part of a 3 year project funded by the German Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU). 
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76% of Germans polled that electricity and energy must continue to remain affordable for all, 
up by two percentage points from the previous year (Forsa, 2014). A majority of 62% 
emphasize that energy supply must be secure and reliable at all times (Forsa, 2014).  Finally, 
in terms of sustainability, 43% considered environmentally friendly energy generation a 
priority, down by two percentage points from the previous year. Nonetheless, public opinion 
is also in favor of energy efficiency and greater integration of renewables lower fossil fuel 
combustion, in turn causing a positive effect on local air quality and human health (Kemfert, 
Opitz, Traber, & Handrich, 2015).  
4.5.2.1. Acceptance of Changes in Affordability 
Zoellner et al. (2008) provide an academic background to findings from the survey conducted 
by the Forsa Institute, wherein affordability had the highest priority among the German 
public. The authors contend that the influence of the economic costs increases with the 
personal relevance of economic and financial issues; for instance, public attitudes could be 
shaped by assumptions regarding the creation of new jobs or decreasing costs of renewables 
in the long run (Zoellner, Schweizer-Ries, & Wemheuer, 2008), 
Strunz (2013) contends that expenses related to integration of renewables have increased 
causing household electricity prices to rise as well. If the transition is not implemented in a 
cost-effective manner, it could leader to lower public acceptance and social imbalances. 
Gawel et al. (2014), however attributes the public opinion regarding costs and market prices 
of renewables vis-à-vis conventional sources to the neglect of future price development. 
Gawel et al. (2014) argue that the current market prices are not commensurate with the 
relevant costs to the national economy, representing a possibility for the market to maintain 
fair technological competition regarding the most favorable manner to generate energy. 
Furthermore, they contend that the additional costs for renewable energy (costs beyond those 
achieved on the power exchange) will drop significantly as a result of the exchange prices, 
which in the mid-term will be oriented on the long-term marginal costs of the conventional 
power plants still producing electricity and will increase after excess capacity is disposed off. 
Additionally, a stronger EU emissions trading system would also rectify the distorted 
exchange prices.  
At the same time, increased use of renewables and greater energy efficiency have facilitated 
an expected decrease in import of fossil fuels, in turn reducing the exposure to volatile prices 
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of fossil fuels (Kemfert, Opitz, Traber, & Handrich, 2015). Kemfert et al. (2015) also posit 
that this relates directly to energy security and less vulnerability imposed by energy imports.  
Gawel et al. (2014) calls for a more holistic and objective debate on the cost of the renewable 
energy expansion which the authors claim is currently focused primarily on the power sector, 
consumer prices, and the impact of the EEG levy on prices – thereby, limiting the role of 
socioeconomic and other real challenges to the energy policy. The authors highlight that in 
addition to power, the heat and transportation sectors are also vital to the energy 
transformation. Additionally, regarding the price of electricity, Gawel et al. (2014) argue that 
a more objective assessment needs to be undertaken including other external costs such as 
environmental and special benefit dimensions (for example, the learning curve effects of 
technological developments). Moreover, every form of subsidy for an energy carrier should 
be considered including financing channels other than the price of electricity.  
4.5.2.2. Acceptance of Changes in Security of Supply 
Building on Gawel’s (2014) claim for a more holistic analysis, this section of the thesis 
assesses literature on the costs associated with changes in security of supply. Strunz (2013) 
argues that the resilience of the transmission grid is essential for the transformation of the 
complete energy system. Given the focus on security of supply in German energy policy, the 
Energiewende should not weaken the system’s overall performance, especially in terms of 
reliable supply. Blackouts or intentional emergency shutdowns of parts of the grid would 
challenge public trust in a renewables based regime (Strunz, 2013). This is also reflected in 
scepticism with the energy transition, wherein 64% of German citizens believe that the 
energy transition will not succeed as planned and it could cause bottlenecks, disruptions, and 
downtimes (Forsa, 2014).   
Praktiknjo (2013) builds upon acceptance of supply security and blackouts by assessing the 
costs of blackouts for private households, especially in the context of the German 
government’s goals of increasing the share of renewables and the nuclear phaseout. Based on 
analysis of data from the Economic Surveys of Private Households, “Einkommens- und 
Verbrauchsstichprobe” (EVS). The author contends that supply security failures in the form 
of blackouts are expensive to residential consumers (Praktiknjo, 2013). Additionally, he also 
asserts that a majority of the German population does not accept lower security of supply in 
favor of a renewable system in the energy sector. Praktiknjo (2013) concludes that the 
Willingness to Accept (WTA) and Willingness to Pay (WTP) based outage costs increase 
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with the duration of the interruption.
40
 However, the average outage costs which are 
represented by the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) decrease with the interruption’s duration. 
Given that the overall costs increase and average costs decrease, the author thus concludes 
that marginal outage costs must be decreasing with an outage’s duration—which in turn, 
means that on average, each additional time period of an outage is less costly than previous 
time periods. As such, during a blackout, there must certain fixed costs that are constant 
regardless of the outage’s duration, which the author attributes to instant data losses in the 
context of private households.  
Furthermore, he assesses the specific share of four areas of inconvenience on total outage 
costs, the observations from which are summarized as follows: 
Table 6: Share of areas of inconvenience on total outage costs adapted from Praktiknjo (2013) 
Spoilage of Food Increases with the duration of power interruption from 
5% (15 minute blackout) to 27% (4 day blackout) 
Absence of heat and hot 
water supply 
Increases with the duration of power interruption from 
9% (15 minute blackout) to 27% (4 day blackout) 
Data losses and 
reconfiguration of electrical 
devices 
Highest share on outage costs (in average) for short 
interruption durations, but decreases with enduring 
outage duration from about 62 (15 minutes blackout) 
to 17% (4 days blackout) 
Limitation of household 
activities for the duration of 
the power outage 
More or less constant for durations between 15 
minutes and 4 days 
 
Additionally, it must be noted that for small consumers such as private households, security 
of supply is shared (Lieb-Dóczy, Börner, & MacKerron, 2003). As a result of technical 
reasons (high costs for provision of real-time meters and switches), no individual 
interruptions occur; instead, neighbors are affected as well and thus, in the case of low 
demand for energy relative to capacity, physical security of supply in non-rivalrous insofar as 
a consumer’s consumption of security does not reduce another’s security, even if they 
consume more (Lieb-Dóczy, Börner, & MacKerron, 2003).  However, in the occurrence of 
limited capacity, an increase in consumption could make an interruption more likely,  
                                                          
40
 Praktiknjo (2013) defines WTP as the maximum amount of money an individual would be willing to pay to 
avoid outages and WTA as the minimum money an individual would be willing to accept as a compensation for 
an outage. The VOLL (Value of Lost Load) is the average cost per unit of unserved electricity to consumers due 
to power outages i.e. the average loss of consumer surplus (CS) per unit of electricity consumption (EC). 
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4.5.2.3. Acceptance of Major Infrastructure Projects 
In the study conducted by Zoellner et al. (2008), the only statistically significant predictor for 
public acceptance for PV solar and wind energy was ‘economic estimation’. While changes 
in landscape were discerned as the second best predictor, the results nonetheless did not reach 
statistical significance in the sample. To reiterate however, the finding are limited to the four 
case studies assessed and can thus not be generalized.  
A key challenge that the BCG report finds is local resistance among communities, including 
senior municipal and state-level policy makers (Gerbert, Rubner, Herhold, & Steffen, 2014). 
For example, Pegnitz in northern Bavaria has experienced opposition to development of 
power lines; one of the three main power lines meant to transport wind power from the north 
to the south would pass through Pegnitz and local residents are concerned that this would 
destroy the landscape, devalue property and cause potential health concerns (Nienaber, 2015). 
This is exacerbated by the decision of the Bavarian premier, Horst Seehofer, the Christian 
Social Union (CSU) to succumb to public opinion and revoke his support for grid expansion. 
However, this is not an isolated incident and protest groups have formed throughout the 
country after the federal network agency presented its master plan to construct three high-
voltage direct-current transmission lines from north to south. For instance, in 2014 villagers 
in Bavaria protested against a similar plan by the network operator Amprion and an attempt 
to construct a similar high voltage-line through the state of Schleswig-Holstein by power 
company TenneT also failed to win substantial support (Eddy, 2014). 
4.5.2.4. Discrepancies in Perceived Justice 
A disparate distribution of the costs of the Energiewende, reflected in changes in affordability, 
security of supply, or siting of infrastructure projects, could lower public acceptance, when 
viewed through the lens of perceived justice. Zoellner et al. (2008) highlights the importance 
of perceived justice. The authors underscore the impact of perceived justice along all three 
temporal dimensions suggested by Wolsink (2007) – opposition is likely to increase if people 
feel excluded from the planning and decision making processes; if operating companies do 
not pay sufficient attention to public relations during the implementation phase; and if, the 
operating communities do not engage with the local communities after the project is 
completed through for example, community festivals or guided tours (Zoellner, Schweizer-
Ries, & Wemheuer, 2008). This underscores a cooperative relation between the operating 
company and the public. An Acceptance Study by RWE (2012) also echoes the belief that 
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citizen participation should be incorporated as a component of project planning from its 
inception; this would not only save time but also facilitate higher planning security when 
progressing with the project.  
The criticality of involving the public in the planning phase, suggested by Wolsink (2007) is 
also highlighted by Gawel et al. (2014).  Given the scope and magnitude of the restructuring 
that the German Energiewende necessitates, it is vital to justify to the public that the 
overarching policy framework is appropriate and that no unneeded costs are being borne by 
the national economy (Gawel, et al., 2014). Concomitantly, alignment on the goals of the 
reforms needs to be attained before the beginning of the reforms. An example of doing so 
would be greater involvement of technocrats. An Acceptance Study commissioned by RWE 
contends that in addition to the political sphere, project managers from the corporate sphere 
should do a better job at clarifying the goals of their projects to the people (RWE AG, 2012).  
Simultaneously, instruments to implement the project should be continually adapted to 
unforeseen challenges and required measures. Accordingly, less than optimal routes of 
development should not be stabilized or rigid; instead, a review, especially of the EEG, 
should be welcomed (Gawel, et al., 2014).   
The difference between legality and legitimacy is also at the forefront of understanding the 
Energiewende. Gawel et al. (2014) argue that the discussion of costs and the utility of the 
Energiewende should not be limited to their relevant amounts, but instead to their distribution 
to individuals, groups, and regions. In line with Wolsink (2007) and Zoellner et al. (2008), 
Gawel et al. (2014) also contend that the distribution of the costs of the Energiewende should 
be transparent and fair. The authors qualify this, using the EEG-levy exemptions as an 
example of the inherently wide and contentious exceptions for industry from the financing of 
the expansion of renewables by all consumers of electricity.  
4.5.2.5. Institutional Factors to Empower the Public 
Zoellner et al. (2008) underscore the vitality of the procedural perspective on social processes, 
especially accounting for perceived justice by the public. In line with Horst (2007) and 
Wolsink (2000, 2007), For example, in one of the case studies, Region A situated in a former 
mining area in East Germany, civil participation was allowed by the Mayor in obligatory 
meetings held by local authorities. In doing so, the Mayor made an exemption to the German 
municipal codes of the federal states (Gemeindeordnungen der Länder) which do not allow 
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civilians who attend the meeting to participate in the debate (Zoellner, Schweizer-Ries, & 
Wemheuer, 2008).  
Zoellner et al. (2008) contend that public participation in the decision making process needs 
to be considered in advance, exemplified in the decision on the location a planned renewable 
project. Successful implementation is also characterized by expressed involvement of local 
authorities.  
Gawel et al. (2014) emphasize the nature of Germany’s federal system in facilitating 
opportunities for development of innovative solutions adapted to decentralized technologies. 
The role of community self-management, in turn, allows the institutional basis for active 
local energy policies. At the same time, the authors contend that the success of the 
Energiewende is contingent on optimizing the overall system and keeping the overall costs as 
low as possible.  Addressing the need to consider location-related consequences, the authors 
advocate efficacious coordination at all levels (national, state, regional, and municipal), as 
well as space- and process- related management. 
Simultaneously, honest communication is essential to acceptance for the German 
Energiwende. The RWE Acceptance Study (2012) finds that in allowing society to address 
conflicts in a proper manner, greater acceptance could be accomplished among citizens. 
Through expert interviews conducted in the study, the report finds that German people are in 
fact ready to accept restrictions that impact their own lives as long as transparent 
communication, substantive justifications, and opportunities to address impact on individuals 
exist. The Study finds that experts are in consensus over the fact that current processes of 
citizen involvement are not working, and need reform.  
The German Federal Government has taken remedial measures that recognize the need for 
transparency and dialogue, as well as seek the endorsement of the public. The BMWi 
recognizes that while there is a large majority is favor of the energy reforms, there 
nonetheless exists a certain lack of acceptance for infrastructure projects (BMWi). 
Accordingly, since January 2015, the BMWi has been supporting public dialogue on grids to 
address the specifics of each case and the interests of all those affected. The initiative for 
public dialogue has a regional approach with a focus on municipalities where an especially 
strong need for communication and discussion is observed. Additionally, from Spring 2015, 
new citizens’ bureaus for matters pertaining to grid expansion will be instituted as local 
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points of contact for the public (BMWi). These bureaus will have the responsibility of not 
only providing information to the public on a case by case basis, but also channeling 
feedback from the public to relevant authorities. Simultaneously, different events such as 
conferences, information markets, and discussion evenings are intended to be rolled out to 
provide the public an opportunity to get together, address any concerns and find amenable 
solutions. Finally, an internet based platform is to be established to disseminate information 
on the initiative and allow more ways for the public to get involved including the possibility 
of an online forum to engage in an online debate and share their perspectives.  
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5. Discussion 
 
As thus illustrated, social acceptance is pivotal to understanding the context for both the 
Merkel Government’s decision for a nuclear shutdown, as well as possible impediments to 
successfully integrate more renewables within the missives of the Energiewende. This section 
thus seeks to compare both public movements based on previous discussion of both, the Anti-
Nuclear movement as well as German acceptance of the new renewables regime. 
Both movements reflect a difference in legality and legitimacy, underlying the fact that even 
though policies and legislative action, mandated by law are present, they may not necessarily 
be accepted by the public. In the case of the Anti-Nuclear movement, safeguards were 
institutionalized, for instance in the checks and balances inherent to the structure of the 
German Nuclear Power Industry; for instance, the Nuclear Safety standards Commission 
(KTA) is tasked with defining precise safety standards for nuclear operations and is 
structured to incorporate different stakeholders with a voting structure that ensures no 
stakeholder group can be overruled. Furthermore, the German Fundamental Safety Concept 
further emphasizes the institutional importance placed on safety. Specifically, the Segregation 
Principle ensures that even if a safety system is threatened or non-functional due to fire or 
flooding, its spillover to other installations is prevented. In the case of the Fukushima Daiichi 
reactor, it had neither sufficient constructional protection, nor did a design that adhered to the 
spatial separation of emergency back-up generators from other safety measures. Even with 
robust security principles in place (discussed in Chapter 3.3.6 Safety standards in Germany), 
public opinion calling for the nuclear shutdown illustrates that while legal, they were not 
deemed legitimate as vanguards for public safety. The ultimate alignment of legality with 
legitimacy was attained only when the nuclear shutdown was ratified by the German 
Parliament. Similarly, the plans for grid expansion have been enshrined in the Energy 
Industry Act (EnWG), Grid Expansion Acceleration Act (NABEG), Fedral Requirement Plan 
Act (BBPIG), and the Power Grid Expansion Act (EnLAG). However, subsequent 
development continues to face public opposition. 
Notwithstanding this incongruence between legality and legitimacy, public attitudes towards 
the nuclear shutdown and towards increased integration of renewables are largely different.  
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As discussed, Wolsink (2000) stated that public attitudes are not adequately encompassed by 
NIMBY-ism, but are instead encompassed within four types (as discussed in Chapter  2.1, 
Understanding NIMBY-ism).  The German anti-nuclear movement started as a movement 
that evolved from Resistance Type C to Resistance Type B, within the typology of resistance 
movements suggested by Wolsink (2000). Resistance Type C movements are characterized 
by positive attitudes that become negative as a consequence of discussion regarding 
implementation of the project. In the case of nuclear development in Germany, it started as an 
initially resilient regime, with positive attitudes among the public, strengthened through the 
mutually enforced pillars of technology, politics, and economics (Strunz, 2013). 
Technologically, energy was generated centrally by nuclear and fossil fuels; economically, 
the market was distributed among the ‘big four’; and finally, politically, the state subsidized 
and supported the regime through the entire value chain. Concomitantly, public acceptance 
was focused on affordability and security of supply, in turn bolstering the resilience of the 
three-pillared fossil fuel-nuclear regime. However, the transition from positive attitudes 
towards an initially relatively benign negative perception in the early 1950s and 1960s, as a 
result of initial skepticism and not deep knowledge of the possible negative consequences of 
nuclear energy. However, the change from a Type C to a Type B movement (general 
opposition to a principle in any neighborhood, Not In Any Backyard (NIABY) behavior) 
occurred with exacerbated perceptions of risk. The accidents at both, Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl provided empirical credibility to initial skepticism; the latter in particular, as a 
result of Chernobyl’s geographic proximity to Germany also made the possible risks 
associated with nuclear more relatable. The precipice of the Anti-Nuclear movement was the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident. In addition to empirical credibility, much like the accidents at 
Three Mile and Chernobyl, the accident at Fukushima caused greater opposition to nuclear, 
including large scale protests such as the 45 km long human chain between the Stuttgart and 
the Necarwestheim nuclear plant. Thus, an initially benign opposition evolved into a Type B 
opposition to nuclear across Germany, rather than being limited to a figurative backyard.  
In contrast, public attitudes towards renewables fall within a combination of Type A 
(NIMBY behavior with positive attitude towards the project as long as it is not implemented 
in one’s own neighborhood) and Type D (Resistance of some specific projects without 
rejection of the principle as a whole). As evidenced in different studies, including an 
Acceptance Study by RWE, the BDI Navigator, and the Forsa Institute, there is broad 
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acceptance among members of the German public for the Energiewende, in principle with 
86% voting in favor of it being relevant for the German population (BDI, 2014). However, 
the difference between acceptances in principle versus in practice is highlighted in public 
resistance towards major infrastructure projects, particularly the development of the 
transmission grid and both on- and offshore wind farms. As noted by Strunz (2013), the 
resilience of the grid is the lynchpin of the resilience of the emergent renewables regime in 
Germany. As discussed in Chapter 4.1 on ‘Security of Supply’, development of the 
transmission grid is essential to both transmit wind power from Germany’s north to the 
country’s industrial south, and integrate solar and wind power locally. However, progress on 
grid development is delayed with only 15% of planned projects having been completed by 
2013 (Gerbert, Rubner, Herhold, & Steffen, 2014), in large part due to local resistance as 
seen in the protests in Bavaria and Schlweswig-Holstein. Similarly, public resistance to wind 
farm development has been characterized as opposition to possible changes in the landscape, 
aesthetic value alteration, and public disturbance evidenced particularly in the case on 
onshore wind farm development in the North and Baltic Seas. As such, even though a 
majority of Germans at 62% in a study by the Forsa Institute (2014) polled in favor of energy 
supply being secure and reliable, they oppose instruments essential to realize this security, 
such as expansion of the transmission grid and on-shore wind farm development. 
Furthermore, rather than being nationalized, the backyard of these movements is limited to 
geographic areas that are directly affected by the progress of these infrastructure projects, 
such as Bavaria where opposition to grid expansion has been particularly strong. In doing so, 
the movement tends to reflect NIMBY tendencies insofar as the German public supports the 
Energiewende and its tenets, including secure supply of energy, in principle but opposes it in 
practice if there is any disturbance to individual locations. 
At the same time, while resistance to infrastructural projects is largely localized, acceptance 
of changes in affordability is more national. In the case of the anti-nuclear movement, the 
perceived risk of nuclear energy and resonance of the same in the German public took 
precedence over the affordability of nuclear energy, foregoing that instead for greater 
integration of renewables. As discussed in the LCOE Analysis of different energy sources in 
Chapter 4.3, LCOE metrics cause a bias in favour of economic competitiveness of 
intermittent and dispatchable sources of energy. In contrast, when taking the system LCOE 
into account, profile and balancing costs are increasingly an issue, particularly in the case of 
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integrating solar and wind power. Additionally, when taking dispatchability into account, 
nuclear has a lower transaction cost relative to renewables.  
In the case of public acceptance of the Energiewende, the situation is different. While not 
currently large enough to be classified as a NIABY movement that culminated in the Merkel 
Government’s decision to abandon nuclear energy, changes in affordability nonetheless 
possess the ability to increase public resistance to the Energiewende. When polled regarding 
which tenet of the Energiewende was of most importance, affordability was ranked highest 
relative to security of supply and sustainability (Forsa, 2014). As analyzed in Chapter 4.3 on 
Affordability, German electricity prices for domestic users are second highest in the 
European continent (and the EU) with an overall increase of 17,5% from 2011. Even though 
costs for energy and supply and network costs changed only moderately, taxes and levies 
increased between minimum 28,8% to 37% for the DA 5 000-15 000 kWh (European 
Commission- Eurostat, 2015; I.E.A - International Energy Agency, 2013). However, in line 
with Gawel’s (2014) claim for a more comprehensive analysis, there are also costs associated 
with less reliable supply of power, through blackouts or intentional emergency shutdowns. 
While Germany has an impressive System Average Interruption Duration Index, grid 
reliability is nonetheless threatened by possible resource inadequacy in the South (due to 
impediments in transmission grid development), inadequate flexibility options including 
energy storage, and limited penetration of smart meters. In this scenario, as concluded by 
Praktiknjo (2013), supply security failures, in the form of blackouts, could be expensive to 
private households and a majority of the German population would be less willing to accept 
lower security of supply for a more renewables-based energy regime. In addition to the 
monetary costs, intangible inconveniences also affect private households including spoilage 
of food, absence of heat and hot water supply, data losses, and limitation of household 
activities.   
 Another factor, while common to both, the Anti-Nuclear movements and public acceptance 
of the Energiewende is the role of the Government. In the case of the Anti-Nuclear movement, 
the shutdown was framed in a political context that was favorable to it. Kitschelt’s assertion 
(1986) regarding the importance of a favorable political climate is underscored in the fact the 
Merkel Government’s decision for the nuclear shutdown came at a time of impending 
elections; growing public resistance would have limited the political opportunities for the 
initially pro-nuclear stance of Merkel’s Government. As such, the decision to abandon 
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nuclear was largely reactionary to mounting public opposition at a time when it had to be 
acquiesced to. Additionally, as noted in Kitschelt’s (1986) second proposition regarding 
mobilization of public opinion, access to political decision making is vital.  The lack of 
political access to the norm entrepreneurs of the Anti-Nuclear movement allowed the 
Government to maintain a pro-nuclear stance through the 1970s and 1980s, in turn causing 
greater opposition to it.  
In contrast, the German public is more vocal about its opinions now and more willing to 
engage in protests in parallel with growing distrust of the Government. As such, instead of a 
reactionary decision as was the case with the nuclear shutdown after Fukushima, the 
Government should be cautious and incorporate a more participatory model to implement the 
Energiewende. Given possible resistance to changes in security of supply and affordability, as 
well as opposition to planned infrastructure projects, the public could perceive a lack of 
justice and transparency especially if the allocation of related costs is not done equitably. The 
German Government has naturally progressed in a direction towards this model of 
implementation by establishing public dialogue initiatives especially for grid development; 
citizens’ bureaus; local engagement through conferences, information markets, and 
discussions; and online engagement. However, these initiatives are nascent at best and 
provide opportunities to be harnessed further to better engage the German public. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Based on available literature and a comparison of the anti-nuclear movement to currently 
prevalent public attitudes in Germany, the importance of public acceptance in implementing 
subsequent steps of the Energiewende is incontrovertible. While the Energiewende is a 
complex topic, this thesis has strived to provide a comprehensive assessment of public 
attitudes, both before and after the Merkel Government’s decision for the nuclear phase-out.  
As discussed, the anti-nuclear movement in Germany was largely driven by scepticism 
against nuclear energy which then evolved into anti-nuclear norms and eventually an anti-
nuclear Germany identity. This movement then found fruition after the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident which made the perceived risks related to nuclear energy more resonant among 
members of the German public. A combination of these risks along with impending elections 
for the ruling coalition played a large part in the Merkel government’s decision for a nuclear 
phase-out by 2022. Much like social pressure was formative in the nuclear shutdown in 
Germany, public acceptance continues to play a crucial role in the future trajectory of the 
Energiewende. Public resistance to infrastructure projects essential to the Energiewende, such 
as expansion of the transmission grid and development of on- and offshore wind farms, has 
met with resistance, largely attributed to the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) phenomenon. 
However, rather than NIMBY-ism, ideas of perceived justice and equity are crucial to 
bolstering public acceptance of the Energiewende. Particularly, the costs for the 
Energiewende must be distributed in an equitable manner to overcome perceived injustices. 
For example, rising prices for domestic consumers could face greater opposition in the future 
should the EEG not be adequately reformed to distribute the surcharge in a balanced manner.  
At the same time, many contradictions in the Energiewende become apparent. Looking ahead, 
this paper proposes that the following questions must be addressed when implementing the 
Energiewende. 
 Given the importance placed on affordability by the German public, how will 
Germany address continuing higher prices for domestic consumers? The System 
LCOE analysis indicates that profile and balancing costs are of increasing importance 
when integrating renewables such as wind and solar. At the same time, the EEG 
surcharge to finance investments for renewables is not distributed evenly between 
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industry and consumers and the share of taxes and levies in domestic consumer prices 
has increased. Germany thus straddles a precarious balance between maintaining its 
international competitiveness and fuelling greater integration of renewables, while 
trying to stabilize domestic consumer prices.  
  
 How will Germany address the seemingly incompatible goals of reducing its GHG 
emissions and simultaneously increasing its share of renewables? As it stands, fossil 
fuels will play a key role as back-up and given adverse health and environmental 
repercussions of fossil fuel combustion, these two goals will be difficult to 
accomplish and increase public opposition at the same time. This is exacerbated by 
the phase-out of nuclear energy, which provided a carbon-free and reliable bridging 
technology for the energy transition. 
 
 How will Germany address the need for greater storage to account for intermittent 
sources, such as solar and wind? While there is considerable research and 
development in progress, storage continues to be an opportunity that needs to be 
further harnessed should Germany wish to successfully integrate more renewables. 
Concomitantly however, this would imply a lower EROI as discussed earlier, and as 
argued by authors such as Morgan (2014) and Weißbach et al. (2013), values lower 
than the threshold required to sustain an industralized society such as the one 
Germany has. Furthermore, possible supply security failures as a result of the lack of 
flexibility options, have associated costs which the German public would be less 
amenable to accepting in favour of a renewables based regime. 
Thus, the public must be engaged adequately when addressing these possibly contentious 
questions. A key channel of strengthening public acceptance is increased transparency by 
Governmental institutions. Corrective action has been taken in this direction, evidenced in the 
amendment of the EEG in 2014 as well as more avenues for public participation in the 
planning of the expansion of the transmission grid. Nonetheless, many public engagement 
initiatives have yet to be realized and there exists sufficient opportunity for the Government 
to strengthen its engagement with the German public and overcome the currently perceived 
notion that they are not sufficiently involved in decision making processes by the 
Government.  
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